Emperor Maximilian I and his Generals in Holland and Brabant (1506-1515) during the Guelders' War

James P. Ward

The war for the possession of Guelders was a dynastic war for supremacy in the duchy, which was fought in the decades about 1500 by Emperor Maximilian I, his son Philip I and grandson Charles V against Charles of Guelders.\(^1\) Primary sources cited in this article show how unpopular the war was with the common people and how, by withholding money for the war, the magistrates in Holland frustrated the emperor and his generals. Maximilian’s fruitless attempts in 1513 to have Henry duke of Brunswick accepted as commander-in-chief in Holland and Brabant are described here in some detail.

“Tall trees are buffeted by the wind” is a fair translation of a Dutch proverb.\(^2\) Emperor Maximilian I of Habsburg certainly received verbal buffeting from his critics down the centuries. Since the sixteenth century, opinions about Maximilian I (1459-1519) have varied from adulation to condemnation; mostly the latter. Earlier assessments of Maximilian’s character and achievements vary little An encyclopedia describes him as handsome and robust, with a well-proportioned figure, a prince who rarely made personal enemies, who was intrepid, intellectual, and the author of military and other reforms, but who was also reckless, mendacious, deceitful, spendthrift, and therefore always in need of money. A contemporary chronicler described him as pious, but in his financial affairs he was imprudent and therefore always poor.\(^3\) In short, he was perhaps an exemplary Renaissance prince.\(^4\)

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2. “Hoge bomen vangen veel wind” in: H. L. Cox (ed.), *Spreekwoordenboek, Nederlands, Fries, Afrikaans, Engels, Duits, Frans, Spaans, Latijn* (Utrecht and Antwerp, 2000), 471-72. This is given in English as: “the bigger they come, the harder they fall.”


Maximilian became known to history as the last knight, a picture of himself which he cultivated during his lifetime. The eighteenth century historian and philosopher David Hume was decidedly cool however. “A man who, of himself, was indeed of little consequence”, wrote Hume about Maximilian, but whose death proved “a kind of aera in the general system of Europe.”

Later, even the success of Maximilian's dynastic marriages policy was considered fortuitous by Kohler, for “contrary to an opinion often met with it is clear that the Habsburg side by no means took the initiative for that portentous dynastic union” with Spain.

More sympathetically, Wiesflecker in a large scale study first analyzed differences of opinion about Maximilian I, especially those of nineteenth and twentieth century German historians, assessing them against the background of internal German politics, the medieval conflict between the papacy and the Empire, and between Austria and Prussia at a later period. Wiesflecker contrasted the universalism of Maximilian with the Little-German (kleindeutsch) nationalism of the emperor's nineteenth century critics. But even in Wiesflecker's study Maximilian's positive qualities are described mostly in general terms (he was likeable, humorous, brave), whereas his negative ones had been described by Maximilian's nineteenth century detractors in sharper terms (indecisive, unreliable, and perhaps worst of all in their eyes, “un-German”). Wiesflecker's aim with his large study was to achieve “neither a vindication (Rettung) nor a glorification” of Maximilian I but a reassessment of the sources towards a newer understanding of the emperor's complex or enigmatic (rätselfvoll) character.

Joachim Whaley, in a description of Emperor Maximilian’s death bed scene, wrote that the contrast was stark between his self-projection as the last knight, the universal monarch, master and savior of Christendom, and the apparently chaotic state of his affairs on his death. Whaley continued, however, that such judgments as the above fail to do justice to the underlying coherence of Maximilian’s policies, and he then amplified by marshaling evidence in favor of the emperor.

21, 139, 147, 177 and 354.


A main pillar of those policies was Maximilian’s need to create a viable territorial base of hereditary lands, among which were the Burgundian territories of his deceased wife, Mary of Burgundy. Another of those territories was the duchy of Guelders which, under the leadership of Charles of Egmond resisted all efforts of the Burgundian Habsburg government to be won over, whether by military or by political means.

The criticisms above do no justice to Maximilian as a military innovator, and as an author whose influence in German literature has been described as of lasting significance. These are achievements on which military and literary historians agree. In the military sphere Maximilian's achievements were original and unusual for his times. An admirer of his father-in-law Charles the Bold (1433-1477), Maximilian acquired from him through Mary of Burgundy (1457-1482) not only ducal and regal rights in Burgundy and the Low Countries but also a tradition and legacy of Burgundian militarism. The years after Maximilian's accession in the Burgundian Low Countries were filled with wars in order to regain territories lost to France following the death of Charles the Bold, with the suppression of revolts in the cities of Flanders and by the peasantry in Holland, and with the crisis of the Burgundian state in 1477.

Charles Oman described Maximilian's victory over the French at Guinegate (1479) as one of the first decisive battles in the history of early modern warfare, and the period as that of the emperor's innovations in military organization, techniques and technology. Kleinschmidt proposed Maximilian's innovations as the inspiration for military reforms which the princes of Orange carried out to modernize their armies at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries.

9. Gerhild Scholz-Williams, The Literary World of Maximilian I: An Annotated Bibliography (St. Louis, 1982); “In German cultural history he stands as virtually the only monarchical litterateur ... deeply embedded in German public communication today”; ibid. pp. 8-9.


In his wars in the Low Countries, after years of bloody struggle, Maximilian achieved success by recovering the greater part of his wife's inheritance, by expelling the French and by suppressing rebellions in Flanders and Holland. But in one war he was singularly unsuccessful; the war for possession of Guelders. An aim of this article is to illustrate how limits were set to the emperor's powers in Holland and Brabant, and to throw some light on reasons for his failure. The dichotomy between Emperor Maximilian's success as a general and his failure as a politician when confronted by opposition from the cities and States of Holland is described here in some detail by his futile attempts to have Henry duke of Brunswick accepted as commander–in-chief in Holland and Brabant in the years 1512-1513.

SOURCES

Political and military events in the war between the Burgundian-Habsburgs and Charles of Guelders (1467-1538) have been studied by several authors, but research into early sixteenth century Holland depended largely on sources from other parts of the Netherlands, particularly from Flanders and Brabant. Extensive use was made of the correspondences of the principal persons at that time, the letters and papers of royal correspondents and their courtiers, edited by Le Glay, Van den Bergh and Nijhoff. However, the completion of a six volume series of source extracts from diets of the States and cities of Holland (1276 to 1515) has changed that appreciably. Using those extracts, an aim of this article is to explore the relationship of emperor

13 James D. Tracy: "sources for political opinion in the Habsburg Netherlands for the first two decades of the sixteenth century are sparse and indirect" in J. D. Tracy, Holland under Habsburg Rule, 1506-1556; The Formation of a Body Politic (Berkeley, 1990), p. 70. Cited hereafter as Tracy, Holland; Karin Tilmans: “For the period 1482 to 1517 there was only a limited amount of historiographic material available in Holland” , and “much of the contemporary history of Holland was hearsay”, K. Tilmans, Historiography and Humanism in Holland in the age of Erasmus: Aurelius and the “Divisiekroniek” of 1517 (Nieuwkoop, 1992), pp. 193-4.


15 J. G. Smit (general ed. and ed.) et al., Bronnen voor de geschiedenis der dagvaarten van de Staten en steden van Holland voor 1544, 6 vols. (The Hague 1987-2012); vol. I (1276-1433 ); II (1433-1467); III (1467-1477); IV (1477-1494), ; V (1494-1506); VI (1506-1515). Vols I and IV each consist of two parts. Extracts and refs. in footnotes hereafter are from J. W. J. Burgers, J .P. Ward and J. G. Smit (eds.), Vol VI, cited as Bronnen , with reference to the page numbers. For use of these sources in a detailed fiscal analysis, see Matthijs Gerrits, Fiscale
Maximilian and his generals with the cities and States of Holland, and to trace the brief troubled career of Henry of Brunswick in Holland in 1512-1513.\textsuperscript{16}

The topic above all which predominated at the diets of the cities and States of Holland in the early decennia of the sixteenth century was the war with Guelders.\textsuperscript{17} Monographs by Kalsbeek and by Struik treated the period of the Guelders war in its entirety but largely from the viewpoint of the history of Guelders\textsuperscript{18}. In Holland the six large cities, Dordrecht, Haarlem, Delft, Leiden, Gouda and Amsterdam formed the strongest economic group; political and military matters described in documents in their municipal archives are discussed here.

THE GUELDERS WAR.\textsuperscript{19}

Guelders, or Gelderland, was a large dukedom to the east of Holland and Brabant which controlled access to and from Germany over the great rivers, the Rhine and the Waal. In 1472 duke Arnold of Guelders borrowed 300,000 gold guilders from Charles the Bold, in surety for which he named Charles as his heir and successor. Shortly afterwards Arnold died (1473) and the States of Guelders recognized his son Adolf as successor. The fief and the titles to the dukedom of Guelders

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16. Sources examined were accounts of the Treasurer for North-Holland at The Hague for incomes and expenditures in the ducal aides and the domain; furthermore, the treasurers' accounts of Haarlem, Leiden Dordrecht and Gouda, and for Haarlem, Leiden and Gouda the minutes of the local councils (Vroedschappen). Contractions used here are NA (National Archives, The Hague; Rek.Rek.: Rekeningen Rekenkamer (Accounts of the Chamber of Finances); GA: Gemeente Archief (City Archives); Tres.rek.: Tresoriers Rekeningen (Treasurers’ Accounts); SA: Secretaries’ Archives; Vroedschapsres.: minutes and resolutions of the local council. References to the sources are augmented when appropriate by references to Bronnen.


and the county of Zutphen, however, were conferred on Charles the Bold by Emperor Frederick III (Maximilian I’s father) at Trier in 1473.

From that time on, the Burgundian and then Habsburg claim to Guelders was based on arguments of legality, one of the results of which was a propaganda offensive in the form of letters and remonstrance to friend and foe. Maximilian I, Philip I and then Charles V of Habsburg found allies in Henry VII and Henry VIII of England. Their adversary Charles of Guelders obtained material help from France and diplomatic help and advice from his kinsman in Scotland, James IV, who was allied to France. This internationalization of the Guelders problem strengthened the hand of Charles of Guelders by giving him a semblance of legality. Without help from France he would otherwise have been unable to prolong the struggle for several decades as he did. Scholars agree that Charles of Guelders, despite his efforts and the negotiations which he conducted, was never formally recognized as duke of Guelders by the Habsburg authorities, although there was a popular misconception that he was. Even Habsburg officials referred to him sometimes as duke (hartoge).

Charles of Guelders’ influence in Guelders and resistance to Burgundian-Habsburg rule was fed by the popular support which he had among the people in the countryside who reacted from their fear of laws administered by foreign officials and their fear of assimilation into Habsburg domination. But it was French foreign aid in money, war supplies and men which enabled Charles of Guelders at times to continue the armed struggle which lasted for half a century. Although his father Adolf had had the support of the principal cities of Guelders they were less supportive of Charles of Guelders. The commercial interests of the urban elites in Guelders, and their links with Holland and the coastal Low Countries were strong enough to make the final conquest of Guelders a normal political consequence at that time.


21. The error appears from time to time in the accounts: NA, Rek.Rek. inv. no. 344, f. 210; GA Leiden, SA I inv. no.383, f. 75 (13 Aug. 1509); GA Haarlem, Tres.rek. 1512-1513, f. 76v (8 May 1513); GA Gouda, Old Archive inv. no. 1170, f. 21; e.g. Bronnen, p. 401. For Charles of Egmond styled duke of Guelders see P.C. Molhuysen and F. K. H. Kossmann (eds.), Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek (Leiden, 1937), 10: col. 441-47.


Attitudes in Holland to the war

In Holland aversion to the war was widespread. Apart from the direct effects of many destructive attacks on cities and towns which Charles of Guelders and his allies carried out, there were other consequences. There was a marked decline in trade and economic prosperity, and a sharp increase in taxation to meet the costs of military defense. Pacifists like Erasmus and his friends suspected the government in Holland of complicity in the war in order to make the magisterial classes more compliant to paying taxes. But even privileged groups within Holland, the clergy and the nobility, were made to feel the pressures of increased taxes. The impetus for that came more from cities like Haarlem and Leiden than from the government. At diets of the States of Holland the cities raised questions about freedom from taxation granted to the privileged groups. For the privileged classes taxes were in the form of forced loans to the government which were not repaid.

The “eternal war about Guelders”, the expression is Wiesflecker's (note 19, above), was seen in Holland as a dynastic matter, propagated by the emperor and his family for their own interests. Evidence for this in the sources is easy to find. Appeals to law and considerations of family pride and personal prestige on the part of emperor Maximilian and his protagonist Charles of Guelders kept the war going. The heroism of three generations of nobility during fifty and more years gave to the war its medieval features. The costs in men and money were borne by others.

24. "ende de declinatie van der neringhe die up dese tijt soe groot is dat sij genoech geheel stille staet…", GA Leiden, Vroedschapsres., f. 77 (2 May 1510); “gemerct dat tettant meestal bij comanschap state”, GA Haarlem, Vroedschapsres. 1501-1516, ff. 125v-126v (19 Jan. 1514). Bronnen, pp. 187 and 437. Some years later while the war continued the vroedschap at Leiden expressed the opinion that “Holland] is based entirely on trade, than which nothing is more contrary than war” (“alsoe tselve lant geheelicken gefondeert is op comanscepe, dan welken niet meer contrarie en is dan oirloge”), GA Leiden, Vroedschapsres., ff. 243-243v (28 Sept. 1517).


When Emperor Maximilian visited Holland in the summer of 1508 in order to assume formally his authority as guardian of his grandson Charles of Habsburg, the city council (vroedschap) at Haarlem expressed the wish to him that Holland should be relieved of the costs of the war with Guelders, or otherwise that it should be made a general war of all the Burgundian States “for we alone cannot bear the burden of the war.” This so-called “general war” is a term which appears repeatedly in sources at Haarlem and Leiden If the war for Guelders was inevitable then it ought to be supported and paid for by all the Habsburg dominions.

At another diet in March 1511, when Margaret of Austria requested 12,000 gold guilders ostensibly for defense of Holland's frontiers (but perhaps also in preparation for an assault on Guelders which took place a few months later), Haarlem's deputies replied to her commissioners Montigny and Wieland that “if our gracious lady has any enemies whom she fears then she should summon a diet of the States General of all the Common Lands, and this city will willingly come and do all in its power as a good member.” The personal emphasis in the expression “whom she fears” cannot be overlooked.

Any alternative to a general war other than peace was to be avoided from Holland's point of view. During a large scale mutiny of soldiers at Delfshaven in 1512 deputies to a diet at The Hague which was held to discuss continuing paying the men refused at first to sanction it. Leiden's magistrates at a meeting of their council gave as the reason; “that we should not enter into the war, and that the same war of Guelders should not become the war of Holland”, was how they expressed it. However, whatever might be asked of them the magistrates of Haarlem and Leiden stated frequently in their resolutions that they would conduct themselves as loyal subjects of the prince.

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29. Wars in the south were paid for by Flanders; N. Maddens, “De beden in het graafschap Vlaanderen tijdens de regering van Keizer Karel V (1515-1550),” Anciens Pays et Assemblees d'Etats/Standen en Landen 72 (1978), p. 373.

30. “heeft mijn genadige vrouw eenige vyanden daer zij voir beducht mach zijn, zij behoirt te roupen ende bescrijven generail dachvaert van alle de landen, daer dese stede gaerne commen sal ende doen nae huere macht als een goed lith van den lande” GA Haarlem, Vroedschapsres., f. 68-68v (27 March 1511), Bronnen, p. 223.


32. GA Haarlem, Vroedschapsres., f. 43v-44 (30 March 1508); ibidem, f. 69 (27 March 1511); ibidem, f. 101v-102v
THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND

In the early part of the sixteenth century the military initiative in the Guelders war lay almost entirely with Charles of Guelders. The wars he fought in Holland and Brabant might be described in modern terms as a guerrilla wars. Fighting sometimes on two fronts at once, Charles of Guelders’ method was to attack with small mobile forces numbering about 800 infantry, 130 cavalry, and armed with a few cannon. Those attacks were made unexpectedly, irrespective of truces and cease-fires to which he had agreed beforehand.

Charles of Guelders’ generals and allies, Maarten van Rossem, Hendrik Ense alias Snijdewind, Pier Gerlofs Donia alias Grote Pier, Jean Chaperon alias Jan Kaproen, Robert de la Marck and others, are still more familiar to the people of Holland and Brabant today than are generals of emperors Maximilian I and Charles V. There is one exception; Maximilian’s unfortunate general Jan van Wassenaer (see below). The sections which follow contain references to the emperor’s general officers in Holland and the Low Countries in the early sixteenth century: Jan and Floris van Egmond, Rudolf von Anhalt, Lucas van Zevenbergen, Jan van Wassenaar, Henry and Eric von Brunswick, and Felix von Werdenberg. In the sources the terms captain and captain general are used to designate their ranks, together with a reference to Holland (van den lande), as in captainship or captainship general of the country. The careers of all of them were beset with the perennial problems of generals: how to pay and hold on to their men and to keep their loyalty, and how to avoid being replaced by abler or more favored officers.


34. “dat heere Karel van Gelre gescreven heeft dat hij den pays tot Camerijk gamaict niet onderhouden en wille,” NA, Rek.Rek. inv. no. 343, f. 209, undated but before 21 March 1509. This was only a few weeks after he had accepted it on 13 Jan. 1509; “want dye heer van Gelre dat bestant nyt en dochte onderhouden, in den dye koninck van Vrancrijc, sijn meester, up ons oirlochde”, GA Woerden, Stadsrek. 1513-1514, f. 4v, undated, Bronnen, p. 442.

On the Burgundian-Habsburg side in Holland, stadholder Jan van Egmond was the highest officer of state and the top military officer responsible for defense. At the beginning of the sixteenth century Jan van Egmond was old and sick, and his duties as stadholder were to a large extent assumed by his nephew Floris van Egmond, lord of Ysselstein.\(^36\) At Leiden a long, cordial and sympathetically worded statement and resolution recalls the good services of Jan van Egmond as stadholder, his advanced age and sickness (outheyt ende crancckheyt zijn edels persons), and the help rendered him by his nephew Floris whom the emperor had appointed as an adjutant stadholder (tot een stedehouder). The resolution records that because Jan van Egmond deserved (vedient heeft) to retain his rights and privileges, no funds had been allocated formally or officially to Floris. To remedy this, Leiden proposed that the States of Holland should offer him a reasonable (redelijke) yearly sum of money for the rest of his life if, as they hoped, he were to remain in Holland.\(^37\)

Floris van Egmond was an experienced and capable military commander, and in 1517 he was appointed stadholder in Friesland when the war there was resumed. But the complexities of the wars in which Holland was engaged at that time, aggravated by a series of dyke breakages and flood disasters in Holland in the years 1506-1514, made it necessary for the military command to be shared with other field commanders. After the failure in 1507 of the first siege of Poederoijen (a Guelders stronghold close to the border\(^38\)), at which Jan van Egmond was commander-in-chief, a Habsburg general, Rudolf von Anhalt, nostre très cher et fèal cousin le prince d’Anhalt, was

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\(^36\) Biographical data for Jan van Egmond (died 1516), Count, Lord of Baer, Purmerend, Hoochwoude and Aartswoude, Knight of the Order of the Golden Fleece, etc. in: Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek 3: col. 330-34, and for his nephew Floris van Egmond (died 1539), Count of Buren and Leerdam, Lord of Ysselstein, Maartensdijk etc., ibid. col. 324-5; A. W. E. Dek, Genealogie der heren en graven van Egmond (The Hague, 1958), 24-5; P. Rosenfeld, “The provincial governors from the minority of Charles V to the Revolt”, Anciens Pays-Standen en Landen 17 (1959), 1-63; ibidem; 16f and 28f. Floris van Ysselstein is named as Stadhouder generael in NA inv. no. 2193, f. 27v, and in the city accounts, passim. For the title “Stadhouder General van Hollant” which was used for Floris van Egmont, see GA Dordrecht, Old archive inv. no. 2, letter no. 121, and for the title “gouverneur van Hollandt”, GA Leiden, SA I inv. no. 592, f. 41v-42, 17 Aug. 1513. Floris is not included as stadholder of Holland in: A. S. De Blécourt and E. M. Meijers, Memorialen van het Hof (den Raad) van Holland, Zeeland en West-Friesland, van den secretaris Jan Rosa (Haarlem, 1925), 1: p. xxxii-xxxiii; Hans Cools, Mannen met Macht. Edellieden en de Moderne Staat in de Bourgondisch-Habsburgse Landen (1475-1530), (Zutphen, 2001); pp. 202-207; henceforth Cools, Mannen met Macht.

\(^37\) GA Leiden inv 383, f. 186, undated; for the magistrates’ journey to The Hague to discuss the matter, ibidem, loose page (5 Aug. 1514); Bronnen, p. 457, note 2.

\(^38\) Bronnen, p. 26.
appointed by the emperor to command Holland’s army at the second siege. Anhalt (ca. 1466-1510), a personal friend of Emperor Maximilian, was successful in 1508 when he took and destroyed the fortress. However, that same summer despite commanding a force of perhaps three thousand men, Anhalt's brief attempts to recover the neighboring towns of Weesp and Muiden in Holland (which had been occupied in a surprise attack by Charles of Guelders) were unsuccessful. With winter approaching and truce talks for a hand-over under way, the cities of Holland were reluctant to pay further sums of money for the sieges. Anhalt withdrew from the fighting in the Low Countries. Until then, published letters from him to Margaret of Austria had been concerned with financial matters, and his complaints about lack of funds to pay his soldiers. Not long afterwards, Maximilian, in a letter from Southern Germany, informed Margaret of Austria of the death of Rudolf von Anhalt; nous avons perdu à luy ung bon vertueux prince et léal serviteur que tout sa vie nous a esté tel. In the same letter the emperor announced his intention to promote the duke of Brunswick to take Anhalt’s place.  

The treaty of Cambrai between the Burgundian-Habsburg government in the Low Countries and Louis XII of France, signed in December 1508, deprived Charles of Guelders of overt French military support. But the war inside Holland flared up again in 1511. It was at that time that first rumors and reports were heard there about the possible appointment of Henry of Brunswick as military high commander in the Low Countries. In a letter to Margaret of Austria, her adviser Ferry de Croix described hearing that Emperor Maximilian


40. The estimate of about 3000 men is based on the 30 000 pounds allocated having been spent in less than one month. Ambassadors who arranged the truce and the Guelders withdrawal from Weesp and Muiden were entertained on their return; Haarlem, Tres.Rek, 1508-1509, f. 52, undated; Ward, Cities and States, p. 225.


44. A text of the treaty of Cambrai (1508) is printed in Le Glay, Negociations, 1: 225-36.
wished to send the duke of Brunswick to take command of the war against Guelders. De Croix advised her against that. He knew (as did she) how sensitive the matters of government appointments were with the northern members of the cities and States of Holland. Especially the appointment of a non-native general as military commander was contrary to provisions made in 1477 following the death of Charles the Bold.

A Burgundian nobleman, Lucas van Zevenbergen, then assumed an undefined function concerning (aengaende) the captaincy general of the army in Holland, and at a diet at The Hague he led discussions about an extraordinary aide for the war. Evidence suggests that Zevenbergen’s role was that of a paymaster general to the armies in Holland. He was born at Brussels, perhaps about 1450. There is little about him in the sources examined, and no evidence that he commanded troops. He was a chamberlain (valet de chamber) of Maximilian, and an orfèvre, i.e. gold- or silver smith, which implies that he was also a banker.

In Antiquity already one of the first things needed to wage proper war was pecunia infinita, and Zevenbergen’s expertise and usefulness to the emperor appears to have been in money matters and diplomacy. He was sent in 1518 as an ambassador to negotiate and reach agreement with the Swiss on what was largely another personal matter of the emperor’s. Maximilian arranged for him to receive 2000 guilders quarterly to meet his expenses; “et que pour le bien et sceurté des communs affairs de nous et nostredit bon filz [Charles V], il est de besoing et très necéssaire que ledit seigneur de Zevemberghe aille et vorse en Suyche….” Emperor Maximilian I concluded a treaty (Erbeinung) with a Swiss confederation Die Drei Bünde (roughly making up present day Graubünden) which bordered on Tirol, his hereditary lands in Austria. The treaty included a non-aggression clause. This letter, dated 12 December 1518, must be one of the last issued by emperor Maximilian who died on 19 January 1519, and it may be

45. Van den Bergh, Correspondance, 2: 59, n. 2. Ferry de Croix, otherwise called Ferry van Croy, was Lord of Roeulx, Knight of the Order of the Golden Fleece, Chamberlain to Charles V, stadholder in Artois, etc; Cools, Mannen met Macht., 193-194.


47. Cicero, primum nervos belli pecuniam infinitam, Philippica V.ii.5.

assessed as evidence for Whaley’s contention that Maximilian’s first and last concern was for the safety and stability of his hereditary lands (note 8).

But there was substance to the rumors De Croix had heard in 1511. Maximilian informed Margaret of Austria in several letters towards the end of 1512 that he was indeed sending Henry of Brunswick to lead the defense of the Low Countries, and, in the face of De Croix’ warnings, she expressed her regret that Brunswick had not been appointed two years earlier. Major concern of the regent, the government, and the cities and States of Holland with the military leadership again became apparent. The proposal was made to appoint four senior officers (“captains”) for defense of the regions Arckel, South-Holland, Rijnland and West-Friesland, who were to be under the command of a captain general. But opinions among the cities of Holland were divided on the appointment of the captain general. In an entry in the council resolutions at Leiden Floris van Egmond is named specifically as captain general. This is an obvious reference to his de facto office of adjutant stadholder and to his military function for which he was responsible to the emperor. But the nobleman who was appointed captain general to lead the forces was Jan van Wassenaer. An explanation for this may lie in the resistance of the northern cities, Haarlem, Leiden, Delft, and Amsterdam, to the original proposal of four captains under a still to be appointed captain general, which they presented at a diet held at The Hague, and then followed up with a compromise naming Wassenaar.

At the end of December 1512 Wassenaer was defeated in an impromptu battle near Amsterdam, captured and held prisoner for two years by Charles of Guelders. A ransom of twenty thousand pounds was demanded for his release, and Holland was in crisis once more. After Wassenaar’s release his greatest problem was how to repay the money lent to him by the cities of Holland to pay his ransom. Margaret of Austria listened to him and described his problems in a letter to her father, pleading, vous supplie, Monseigneur, en tous sesdites affaires, l’avoir pour

49. Van den Bergh, Correspondance, 2: 32 (16 April 1512); ibid. 42-4 (20 Aug. 1512); ibid. 47-8 (30 Sept. 1512); ibid. 52-3 (3 Nov. 1512); ibid. 56-8 (10 Dec. 1512); ibid. 58-60 (15 Dec. 1512). Similarly in: Le Glay, Correspondance, 2: 24-25; ibid. 65-67.


51. GA Leiden, inv. no. 592, f. 31 (25 Nov. 1512); Bronnen, p. 353.
best generals, and his personal friends, and it was the emperor’s intention that these men should command his armies in Holland and Brabant.

Eric the Elder’s most famous and celebrated feat of arms was in 1504 at the battle of Wenzenberg during a campaign in the Upper Palatinate when he rescued Maximilian after the emperor’s horse was brought down in the fighting. Eric also saw military service in the emperor's Italian campaigns. The brothers still have a place in German history because of legal matters surrounding their inheritances and titles, and the territorial division of the dukedom of Brunswick. In contrast, their short period in Holland and Brabant is less well known and it was spent in military affairs. Emperor Maximilian had a high opinion of the brothers’ military prowess. His description of Henry as a good and brave prince, however, has to be assessed together with the opinion of other contemporaries that he was known as Henry the Bad. Pontanus in his history of Guelders described Henry of Brunswick as *alter quasi Achilles Germanicus*. Wiesflecker described Eric as a swashbuckler (*Haudegen*).58

The emperor had intended that Henry of Brunswick should take command of 1500 infantrymen and 600 cavalry in the Low Countries for the defense of the common frontier with Guelders in the winter of 1512-13.59 Forces of about this size were thought adequate for defense. The emperor’s plan may have been to station Eric in Holland at or near Gorinchem, and Henry in Brabant, at or near Breda. Deputies from the States of Holland and the States of Brabant attended on each of the brothers at those places.60 Strategically they would have been well placed there either to meet military threats from across the border with Guelders or to launch an attack against Guelders.

But the arrival of the two brothers in Holland in December 1512 was untimely. Eric announced that he could provide the immediate service of a thousand or twelve hundred men


(knechten) just at the time when consent had been given by the cities and States of Holland for a force of one thousand under the command of Jan van Delft.\(^{61}\) Negotiations with the brothers Brunswick were opened but at almost the same moment Eric and his troops were dismissed for he was called away “in haste” on the urgent business of a law suit in Brunswick.\(^{62}\)

Henry of Brunswick remained in the Low Countries and he visited Dordrecht at the end of January 1513. His first action in Holland was to ask for 12,120 gold guilders (about 17000 pounds of 40 groats) from the States of Holland which he needed for the first month's pay of his 1200 cavalry men. The money requested is described in the sources as a loan. The cities of Antwerp, Mechelen and ’s-Hertogenbosch in Brabant had agreed to a similar request for a month's wages for Henry and his men, and Emperor Maximilian expressed his thanks to them in a letter to Margaret of Austria.\(^{63}\) But the council at Haarlem decided that it was impossible (ondoenlick) to agree to it.\(^{64}\)

At a diet of the cities and States of Holland which was held at The Hague in January 1513 Henry of Brunswick appeared in person and repeated his request for money. Haarlem and Leiden both had difficulty with it, and Henry was so piqued that he rode off “in an angry mood” (mit eenen arren moed).\(^{65}\) Under pressure from government officials, deputies to the diet rode after him, and at Delft they agreed to his wishes. The money was to be advanced as a loan which was to be repaid when Brunswick received his pay from the emperor. If “for whatever reason” Brunswick did not receive any pay from the emperor, then he agreed not to leave Holland, and he gave written guarantees under his seal and swore an oath to that effect. Similar conditions had

\(^{61}\) “Item dat naderhant hertoge Errick van Bruynswijck gecommen was tot Gorchum, die raidt wiste omme X of XII/C knechten,”, GA Haarlem, Vroedschapsres., f. 105v-107 (29 Dec. 1512). "Naderhant" ("after that") referred to the fact that Jan van Delft had just previously received consent to recruit 1000 men; GA Leiden, Vroedschapsres., f. 136v (31 Dec. 1512); Bronnen, pp. 357 and 358.


\(^{63}\) “avons escript ausdites villes [Anvers, Malines, Bois-le-Duc], les remerciant de leur bon vouloir, comme aussi avons fait à vous,” Le Glay, Correspondance, 2: 86 (21 Jan. 1513).

\(^{64}\) GA Haarlem, Vroedschapsres., f. 109v-110v (26 Jan. 1513); GA Haarlem, Tres.rek. 1512-1513, f. 68-68v (28 Jan. 1513); Bronnen, p. 371.

\(^{65}\) GA Leiden, SA I, inv. no. 592, f. 34v-35 (26 Jan. 1513); GA Leiden, Vroedschapsres., f. 140v (29 Jan. 1513); Bronnen, pp. 372 and 373.
applied to the money advanced to him, “in his need” (*in zyne noetzaeken*), by the cities of Brabant, which the magistrates there too wanted to be seen as an advance on their future obligations to the government.66

Shortly afterwards the emperor and the regent proposed formally that the duke of Brunswick should be appointed captain general to defend Holland, Friesland and Brabant. Haarlem’s deputies to the States of Holland protested. The Haarlem council opposed the measure emphatically on the grounds that the stadholder was the person to whom this office was entrusted, and “they could take no other.”67 Leiden and Gouda were more reserved. At first Gouda was willing to go along with a majority of the cities of Holland, but later the magistrates decided that only if there were agreement to the proposal within the States General as a whole (an improbable event) would they consent. Their intention clearly was to spread the financial burden. However, the council at Gouda ended their resolution with an alternative motion to request Floris van Ysselstein to defend Holland with a “reasonable number” of troops.68

Meanwhile, new negotiations were conducted with Henry of Brunswick about his needs for money and men, in the light of the more modest proposals of the cities of Holland. At a diet of the States General held at Mechelen towards the end of February 1513 Henry of Brunswick appeared there too in person to explain his mission and to justify his requests for money. He reminded the deputies that he had been sent by the emperor, his “lord and master” he called him, and that he had been promised help with men, horses and munitions for the defense of the country. He said furthermore that he had been five months in the Low Countries but he had received pay

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66. “gestelt sel een preste van 12.000 etc. gouden gulden, diewelcke hij tlandt weder beloet heft te restitueren wanneer hij sijn penning van de K.M. ontfangen sel hebben van sijn soudie, ende indien hij sijne gelden niet en ontfink bij faulte van enige saicke. soe en sal hij niet reysen uut de lande ten sij dat hij tlandt weder betaalt ende tevreden hebben, ende hieroff te gheven sijn zegel ende brieve.”, GA Leiden, Vroedschapsres., f. 140v (29 Jan. 1513); “… den steden van Mechelen ende Antwerpen, die zijnre genaden [Duke Henry] van gelijcken leeningen gedaen hadden in zijne noetzaeken,” NA, Rek.Rek. inv. no. 2193, f. 15, undated. No evidence was found that he received any pay or repaid the loan.

67. GA Haarlem, Tres.rek. 1512-1513, f. 70-70v (25 Feb. 1513); “daerup is eendrachtelick geseyt dat wij hebben mijn heere de stadhouder tot een cappiteyn ende geen ander nemen en mogen,” GA Haarlem, Vroedschapsres., f. 114-14v (3 March 1513), and GA Haarlem, Tres.rek. 1512-1513, f. 70v-71, same date; Bronnen, p. 380.

68. GA Leiden, SA I, inv. no. 592, f. 35v-36 (4 March 1513). Further: GA Leiden, SA I, inv. no. 592, f. 31v-32; ibid. f. 32; “is gesloeten bij der vroesschaap angaende tannemen van mijn here van Bruynswijck dat men dairinne niet doen sal ten waire bij alle den geemenen landen, alsoewel Brabant, Vlaenderen, Henegouwen, Zeelant, Artloys, gelickelijken sulcx deden,” GA Gouda, Old Archive, inv. no. 42, f. 32v (11 March 1513); “mit een redelijck getal van knechten,” ibid., where Floris is also called stadholder; both printed in *Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap*, 37 (1916), 76-77; Bronnen, pp. 380 and 383.
for himself and his men for only two months. He added that he was now thinking of leaving the country, but would stay until St George's Day (23 April). However, if they wanted to keep him then he would need payment for 4000 men and 1200 cavalry in order to fulfill his task of defending Brabant and Holland, and still more men and money if he were required to undertake a march (eenen tocht) into enemy country.69 This remark of Brunswick's about a larger force is an indication that “his lord and master”, Maximilian, intended him to lead a summer expedition into Guelders, similar to the (unsuccessful) expedition against Venlo in 1511. The Hollanders, however, continued to consult among themselves to find a cheaper way of defending Holland.70

In Holland the question of the so-called loans to Brunswick continued to occupy the diets at The Hague, but there is little detail in the sources about Brunswick's military activities. He was asked by the magistrates to pay attention to how the frontiers could best be defended and “to keep an eye on the quarter of Rijnland” when Leiden received warning of an attack there by Guelders.71

The spring of the year advanced and the dangers of winter receded. Ice on the waterways, which had made the countryside passable for an enemy, melted. The cities of North-Holland now believed that part of Brunswick's forces should be paid off, and a truce should be sought from Charles of Guelders. They proposed the expedient that each city should be responsible for defending its own quarter, “since they are abandoned enough by the other quarter”, probably a reference to Dordrecht and South Holland, which generally sided with the government. They also called for renewed peace efforts to be made, “for there is no consolation nor reliance in raising more money for the war.”72

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69. “om de voirs. landen te bewaeren zijn genaden hebben mosten IIII*M* voetknechten ende XII*C* paerden, behoudelick, indien de voirs. landen wilden dat zijn genaden eenen tocht doen zoude in der vijanden landen, dat men in dat geval zijne genaden meer volcx doen moste etc.”, GA Leiden, Vroedschapsres., f. 142v-143v (3 March 1513); Bronnen, p. 381.

70. GA Leiden, inv. no. 592, f. 31v-32 (8 March 1513); cf. Bronnen, p. 382.

71. “alzoe die stede van Leyden gewaerschuwet was dat die Gelderschen hueren aenslach doen souden int voers. quartier van Rijnlant, ende oek omme te versoucken dat den Raedt mijn heer van Bruynswijck hierof wilde adverteren ende aen zijne genaden begeren dat hij het oeghe opt voers. quartier wilde hebben,” GA Leiden, SA I, inv. no. 592, f. 35 (13 Feb. 1513).

72. GA Leiden, SA I, inv. no. 592, f. 36 (24 March 1513); “verclaerende dat men mach scicken te gecrijgen payse of bestant want vorder penningen totter oirloge up te brengen hier geen troest en is noch verlaet,” GA Haarlem, Vroedschapsres., f. 116v-117 (1 April 1513); ibid. f. 119v-120 (2 May 1513); “die drie steden als Delf, Leijden ende Goude samentlick gedelibereert zijn, die quartieren onder himluyden gelegenhe te defenderen voor den tijt van een maent, alzoe zij hemluyden van den anderen quartier genouch verlaten worden etc.,” GA Leiden, SA I, inv. no. 592, f. 32-32v (16 April 1513); Bronnen, pp. 386 and 390.
re-iterated at length during a diet at The Hague that the duke of Brunswick had been sent at the request of the emperor and with the consent of the States of Brabant in order to defend the country and to force Charles of Guelders to accept a peace treaty. Oem van Wijngaarden's words paraphrased what Maximilian had written to his daughter Margaret months earlier: the emperor’s aims were peace for the country and its wellbeing, and that the war was a result of the duplicity of Charles of Guelders in breaking the terms of the treaty made at Cambrai in 1508. However, Oem van Wijngaarden's words had no effect, other than, perhaps, to stiffen the Hollanders' resolve not to give more money for the war.

With the passing of winter 1512-13 the period of maximum danger was over for the time being, but unrest in Holland was still on the increase, caused by the continuing threat of attack from Guelders, and the continuous rumors, which required defensive measures to be taken. Delegates from Leiden went to Alphen near the border to discuss defense measures there. Schoonhoven was attacked by Charles of Guelders, and here Jan van Delft who had raised the force of one thousand men for Holland only some months earlier was killed in the fighting. Talks continued about setting up a force with Henry of Brunswick as commander of 2000 men for a period of three months to resist the latest attacks by Charles of Guelders, but now the intention of the cities of Holland to entrust the position of captain general entirely to Floris van Ysselstein with a plan for a regular defense (een geregelde effencie) of the country was beginning to come into effect.
By May 1513 Henry of Brunswick had given up hope of being able to carry out Emperor Maximilian's wishes. Privy councilors Henry of Nassau and Roland le Fevre described in a letter to the regent Margaret of Austria that Brunswick wished to negotiate with English emissaries on how to take service under king Henry VIII. Were they unaware of the irony of this? A generation earlier, at the last major battle (1487) in the Wars of the Roses, 2000 German landsknechts, paid for by Charles the Bold’s widow, Margaret of York, had fought under their captain, Martin Schwartz, against Henry VII at Stoke Field, and were annihilated by the Lancastrians.76

But in any case, with both sides nearly exhausted, a truce with Guelders was close at hand (Brussels, July 1513), which, if it were effective, would deprive Brunswick and his men of employment in Holland for the next few years. Henry of Brunswick went to the North to serve in Friesland where there was continuing armed resistance to Habsburg’s influence and expansion. Emperor Maximilian and Philip I had some years previously (1498) ceded Friesland to Albert duke of Saxony (1443-1500.), who was succeeded by his son George (1471-1539). According to the monk Paulus Rodolphi of Rixtel writing in his chronicle of the wars, Henry of Brunswick was shot in the head and killed in Friesland while fighting in the army of George, duke of Saxony in June 1514. Henry's body was returned to Germany where it was buried at Wolfenbüttel.77

Following the treaty of Brussels in July 1513, emperor Maximilian planned early in 1514 the formation of a war council with a consultative function for the Low Countries. The members included, among others, the generals Henry of Nassau, Felix of Werdenberg, Floris van Egmond, Ysselstein etc. annemen zal voer cappeteyn ende bescernmer van den lande,” GA Gouda, Vroedschapsres., Old Archive I, inv. no. 42, f. 33 (9 May 1513); printed in Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap, 37 (1916), 78; Bronnen, pp. 402 and 403.


John of Wassenaar and the banker, presumed paymaster, Lucas of Zevenbergen, all of whom were active, militarily and diplomatically in the emperor’s service in Holland and Friesland and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{78}

Felix von Werdenberg was yet another personal and valued friend of Emperor Maximilian, and of Maximilian’s daughter, Margaret of Austria, as a letter to her father at that time attests\textsuperscript{79}: “quant a mon cousin le conte Felix, je láy fait et ferey toujourss appelle en tous conseaulx d’importance; el le treuve saige et pretieulx personneaige auquel, pour la’amour de vous ed de l’affinite qui est entre vous, moy et luy, vouldroie faire tout plesir et adresse.”

At a diet of the States General which was held at Brussels during most of December 1514, Felix von Werdenberg, in an important diplomatic role, presented to the assembly emperor Maximilian’s formal proposal (\textit{peticie}) for a permanent (\textit{alle jairen}) force of 1500 men to defend the frontiers. The delegates refused the request.\textsuperscript{80} Felix continued to soldier in the Low Countries, taking part with his landsknechts in the Friesland campaign.\textsuperscript{81} In September 1516 he helped Floris van IJsselstein to quell a mutiny of Floris’s soldiers who became disaffected when they recognized that Felix’s men were being better paid than they were. So the war in the Low Countries dragged on, and entered a new phase in the North when Charles of Guelders was invited by the Frisians to become their “lord and protector” against the Burgundian-Habsburgs. Following the death of Emperor Maximilian in January 1519 Felix von Werdenberg played a part in negotiations for the formal transfer of power locally in Friesland to Charles V.\textsuperscript{82}

\textbf{Why so long?}

Why did the Guelders war continue for so long? Because of a mutual, deep, unbridgeable


\textsuperscript{79} Le Glay, \textit{Correspondance}, 2: 261-62 (14 or 16 June 1514 [sic]).


\textsuperscript{81} Leiden, Vroedschap Resolutions, f. 209-209v (22 Sept. 1516); Tilmans, \textit{Divisiekroniek}, 519-20; J P. Ward, “Military pay and Taxation in Early 16\textsuperscript{th} Century Holland during the Guelders War”, p. 17, online at \texttt{http://www.james.wardware.com/}

distrust between the two main parties, emperor Maximilian and Charles of Guelders. Even with the grudging financial support of the cities and States of Holland they failed to achieve peace and a lasting solution to the Guelders problem through negotiation. Charles of Guelders relied on the support he had in the States of Guelders and among the lower North German nobility, and the money and material help he received from France. Maximilian referred to the legal position, the acquisition of Guelders by his father-in-law Charles the Bold, and the repeated bad faith and broken promises of Charles of Guelders. Emperor Maximilian and Charles of Guelders had both, necessarily, to be dead (from natural causes, may it be said, not on the battlefield) before a political solution could be reached.

1. Charles of Guelders’ distrust of emperor Maximilian was open, and reciprocal. During their earliest encounters in the late 1470's when Charles of Guelders was still a child he and his father had been virtually prisoners of the Habsburgs. It has been remarked that none of Charles of Guelders contemporaries who were close to him have left a biography or character sketch of him. If they had, distrust of his enemies and reliance on his own military instincts might have figured as his most important characteristics. Charles of Guelders did not trust nor believe in Maximilian's motives, because the solutions which the emperor offered during years of negotiation meant only annexation of Guelders to Habsburg rule. The year 1511 was a turning point when negotiations for a marriage between Charles of Guelders and Isobel, a daughter of Philip I and granddaughter of Maximilian, failed. Margaret of Austria made great efforts to ensure success for the negotiations, but a draft of the proposed marriage settlement makes it clear that it reflected only Maximilian's policies and had little consideration for the interests or feelings of Charles of Guelders. Exchange of some money and some territory (not Arnhem, however, the capital, which was in Burgundian-Habsburg hands) was to be regulated, but essential clauses on fealty and the succession would have ensured that Guelders become and would remain a Burgundian-Habsburg dominion. Charles of Guelders' withdrew from the negotiations.

2. Emperor Maximilian failed to convince the States of Holland, and even fully to convince his daughter. He explained in a letter to Margaret of Austria in December 1512 his

83. Kalsbeek, Betrekkingen, 83. The clauses of the proposed marriage contract and treaty in 1511 are summarized in Le Glay, Correspondance, 1: 281-2, n. 2 there. In later phases of the war (which lasted to 1543), and until his death in 1538, the conditions offered to Charles of Guelders were no better.
policy and his reasons for sending the dukes of Brunswick to the Low Countries, and he ordered her that his motives were to be communicated to the States. The reasons the emperor gave, namely the wellbeing of his dominions in the Low Countries, peace and tranquility, observance of the Treaty of Cambrai, failed to convince the States of Holland and they remained unsympathetic to his wishes. Maximilian’s words were repeated at diets of the States and Holland; that he had sent the dukes of Brunswick “in his own place.” With these, and with similar explicit expressions (en nostre lieu; en nostre absence) the emperor emphasized that he intended Henry of Brunswick to have the rank and authority of supreme military commander in the Low Countries.

When changes to the military top were being considered Ferry de Croix advised Margaret of Austria against appointing Brunswick as commander. His reasons are easy to understand. The States, whenever they sought an argument, resorted to law and permitted no infringement of their rights without protesting and appealing to the Great Privilege of 1477 which had been conceded by Mary of Burgundy following the death of Charles the Bold. While much of the Great Privilege was a dead letter it contained clauses which could still excite the emotions of delegates to the diets. One clause concerned taxation which, could not be forced on the cities of Holland without their consent. Another clause concerned the nationality (to use a modern term) of the state’s office holders who were required to be natives of Holland, Zeeland or Friesland. Since Jan van Egmont as stadholder in Holland was responsible for defense and was supported by his nephew Floris as de facto stadholder and army commander, De Croix saw no reason for the emperor to add to the regent's problems by appointing Brunswick over the heads of two much admired men, and so he advised against it.

3. The viewpoints of the cities and States of Holland are found on page after page of their local councils’ resolutions. A recurring theme in the minutes of the local council meetings of Haarlem and Leiden was to harp back to the provisions of the Great Privilege of 1477, which Mary of Burgundy had conceded under pressure of the emergencies following the death of her father Charles the Bold. One of those provisions was that in matters pertaining to the aides (bede),

84. But in 1515, on Charles of Habsburg coming of age, the council at Haarlem debated a motion put forward by other cities at a diet of the States of Holland requiring Charles' consent to “de previlegie van vrouwe Marie datter nyemant enige officie of dienste voeren en sal dan Hollander, Zeelander of Vrieslander geboren,” GA Haarlem, Vroedschapsres., loose page at f. 157 (28 May 1515). Members of the Haarlem council were indifferent to the motion and said so; Bronnen, p. 522.
the presence of the prince in person or his regent was required in Holland in order to validate the grant.

The cities and States of Holland did not believe nor trust Maximilian's protestations, because for all his talk of peace and security the means he employed were war which the States, in their own words, described as contrary to all their interests in commerce and trade. The cities and States of Holland saw in the wars only the dynastic interests of the emperor; and that if the wars continued it would lead to their ruin, and they said so. When the negotiations of 1511 broke down, the cities of Holland, opposed though they were to the war, made an exception. Recognizing some truth in the regent's assertion that she could not achieve peace by negotiation if "her neighbour" Charles of Guelders proved unwilling, they approved the costs of the military campaign and siege of Venlo in 1512. But it failed. The siege was followed in December 1512 by Wassenaar's defeat and capture. The war continued to be a disaster for Holland.

4. Generals expressed their disappointment and anger openly when frustrated in their pleas for more money and men. In 1508, when the cities of Holland objected to paying for the sieges of Poederoyen, Jan and Floris van Egmond at a diet remarked "very forcibly and angrily" (zeer hertelijck ende scharpelick) that the magistrates, if they would not consent to pay more, should in that case "come with the banners" (dat men mitten bannieren overal optie frontieren van desen lande comen moste) "because the regent’s troops had been paid off."86

Holland’s magistrates treated the emperor’s personal friends, Anhalt, Brunswick, Werdenberg, scarcely with the deference they were used to in their homelands. One can only speculate on what effects such slights may have had on hot blooded men like the generals, but their patience was clearly strained at times. After all, Felix von Werdenberg in 1511 plotted against and murdered a fellow nobleman just for joking at a wedding reception about his small stature (note 80). In 1508, after his success at the second siege of Poederoyen,

85. “onse genadige vrouwe heeft doen proponeren dat huere genaden altijt gearbeyt heft om dese landen in payse tonderhouden, ende dat dies niet tegenstaende die heere van Gelre gheen voirwaerde, payse noch tractaet en onderhoudt, ende dat sij niet langer vrede mach hebben dan hore naegebueren willen,” GA Leiden, Vroedschapsres., f. 99 (29 July 1511); Bronnen, p. 250.

86. Haarlem, Vroedschapsres.f. 42v-43v (27 March 1508); Bronnen, p. 82. “Banners” - it might be meant literally, but a banner was also a military unit of 400 men.
Rudolf von Anhalt, was faced with the imminent failure of the sieges of Weesp and Muiden because the cities had supplied him with men and funds for only one month. He, however, took leave with dignity, writing to the regent a pious wish; “Madame, je prye à tant nostre Seigneur vous donner bonne vye et longue.”

In March 1511, Floris van Egmond carried out a pre-emptive strike against troops assembled near the city of Utrecht, which, although inimical, was in theory a neutral state or province. In a letter to the States of Holland he took personal responsibility (in zijn zelfs naam) for his insubordination and cleared Holland of all blame, but he justified himself with the remark that he feared Charles of Guelders might otherwise recruit the men, and that he should not have them (datse de heere van Geldre ymmers nyet en gecrijje).

In 1513 Heinrich of Brunswick expressed his anger publicly (see above) at the treatment he received on arriving in Holland; so much had been promised him, but the little that he had received from the States of Holland and of Brabant was in the form of loans for which he had had to give guarantees and swear an oath! In 1513 and 1514, the years in which Jan van Wassenaar was held captive by Charles of Egmond, the cities and States of Holland baulked at having to pay his 20 000 pounds ransom. Despite Wassenaar’s complaints of having endured “troubles, pain, sorrow, ruinous costs, etc.” (last, pijn, verdriet, verderflick cost ende anders), his ransom was discussed at numerous diets of the cities and States of Holland in an unsympathetic light. Wassenaar, his wife and daughter personally, and the regent Margaret of Austria had to plead his case with the cities before they would release him from the debt.

Epilogue

If Maximilian, or the regent, Margaret of Austria, had appeared in person to ask for money for Brunswick it is possible that the cities and States of Holland would have consented, or at least not dared to refuse. In 1512-13 there were precedents for Maximilian’s coming to Holland. During his Joyous Entry (Blijde Inkomste) to the Low Countries in 1508 the emperor had attended diets at

88. Bronnen, pp. 212-213
89. See Bronnen, Index, p. 573 where there are five entries referring to Wassenaar’s ransom (losgeld).
The Hague and the principal cities of Holland\(^90\). Among other business on defense matters he succeeded in getting 40,000 pounds for the (successful) second siege of Poederoijen, and 30,000 for the sieges of Weesp and Muiden (which failed; the sum was patently inadequate). Next, throughout June and July 1509 the regent Margaret of Austria also resided in Holland at The Hague, where she presided over diets of the States of Holland and used her diplomatic skills to good effect. There she smoothed out disagreements with the cities and States of Holland about aides which they had paid previously. On that occasion, which was one of several legal challenges, the cities won the argument by proving that they had paid more than was required of them. This could only strengthen their belief that the government was not infallible in law.

However, emperor Maximilian did not go to Holland in 1513 to make his request in person to the cities and States of Holland. With Henry VIII of England, his ally in the Holy League, he was waging war against the French further south. The war for Guelders continued.

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\(^{90}\) J. G. Smit, *Vorst en Onderdan. Studies over Holland en Zeeland in de late Middeleeuwen* (Leeuwen, 1995), passim.