The Military Role of the Magistrates in Holland during the Guelders War

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Sources in the city and state archives of Holland show that at the beginning of the sixteenth century the magistrates of Holland were proficient in military matters of defense. During the Guelders war, which lasted until 1543, they hired and paid soldiers, arranged billets for them, confronted mutinies, controlled local military dispositions and costs, purchased and distributed weapons to their burghers, had munitions manufactured for them locally, supervised drills, mustered men, and, within their cities, organized resistance to the Guelders enemy. Two generations later, at the time of the Dutch Revolt, the same skills were needed again to help defeat Philip II.

Introduction

The publication in 1956 of Michael Roberts’ essay, “The Military Revolution,” inspired a spate of studies and monographs on the subject of warfare and of armies, their organization and weapons which continues to the present day. These studies augment older studies of warfare and relate them to newer disciplines.1 With few exceptions, however, scholars have continued to give their attention mostly to what may be called the “bigger picture,” to armies recruited by emperors, princes, and generals. These reflect a bias in two directions. They


In contrast to this, the level, scale and sophistication of military organization which was in the hands of city magistrates and aldermen in Holland in the early sixteenth century is less well known. The aim of this article is to show to what extent and by what means the magistrates, aldermen and burghers of Holland fought a daring and persistent foe, Charles, duke of Guelders. The Guelders War is covered here in some detail from 1508 to 1517 from the perspective of the cities of Holland, with the emphasis not on armies, campaigns and battles, but on the efforts mainly of civilians to organize and defend themselves.\footnote{Only the overt military activities of the magistrates are described. Espionage and counter-espionage are not included here. This is part of the author’s unpublished doctoral thesis: J. P. Ward, “The Cities and States of Holland (1506–1515). A Participative System of Government Under Strain” (University of Leiden, 2001). The caesura are the death of Philip I in 1506 and the coming of age of his son, Charles V, in 1515. The material has been collected primarily from the archives.} The theater of war is limited by geography and time, but the sources reveal facts that are general, repetitive and structural with respect to “guerrilla” wars. As a corollary, it will be argued briefly that the magistrates of early sixteenth-century Holland served as a model for their successors in the latter half of the century, at the time of the Dutch Revolt against King Philip II.
The sources used are the financial accounts of individual cities in Holland, mainly Haarlem and Leiden, but with some data from Gouda and Dordrecht; also used were accounts of the central government in The Hague kept by successive Treasurers for North-Holland. In Leiden and Haarlem most of the account books, council minutes and resolutions, and records of public announcements survive for the years under review here. The most important sources for charting the effects of the Guelders war on the lives of ordinary people in Holland are the minutes of private and confidential meetings held by the local councils (vroedschappen) in Holland, and the public announcements, made by the magistrates, of local by-laws and government proclamations.

These public announcements, contained in the cities’ so-called aflezingboeken (proclamation books), governed such matters as law and order, regulation of markets, excise duties and taxation, public health and safety, military service, military defense, and other matters of importance in the daily lives of the citizens. In particular, the military matters included in the account books and in the resolutions of the local councils must raise doubts about whether the magistrates of the early sixteenth century were “mere laymen” when it came to military affairs.

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6 As expressed, for example, by J. D. Tracy, Holland under Habsburg Rule 1506–1566: The Formation of a Body Politic (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1990), p. 74: “... it was a measure of the government’s desperation that deputies to the states, mere laymen in military matters, were invited to play a role in important decisions.”
Holland in the Early Sixteenth Century

In financial terms the cities of Holland formed the strongest group in civic and political society. Documentary evidence shows major differences between two groups of cities and towns. The six large cities – Dordrecht, Haarlem, Delft, Leiden, Gouda and Amsterdam – were referred to as such (grote steden). The small towns (kleine steden) included Gorinchem, Rotterdam, Schiedam and Vlaardingen, as well as many others. The status of the major cities was determined partly by reasons of history, and partly by size and wealth. It has been estimated that in 1514 more than half the population of Holland lived in towns or cities. The largest of these, Leiden and Amsterdam, had populations at the time of around 12,000–14,000, Haarlem and Delft around 10,000–12,000, while Dordrecht and Gouda had around 7,000–10,000 each. When Antonio de Beatis traveled through the Low Countries in 1517, he wrote in his diary estimates of the sizes of the communities which he visited in Holland, using hearths as a means of calculation: Dordrecht 3000 hearths, Rotterdam 1800, Delft 5000, The Hague 6000, and Gorinchem 3000. For Dordrecht and Delft these data are commensurate with the other estimates given, assuming a multiplication of the number of hearths by a factor between 2.5 and 3 to arrive at the number of persons in each household. J. C. Naber in his statistical analysis of early sixteenth-century Holland estimated 3 to 4 communicants per household.7

The cities and towns were administered by colleges of magistrates that formed the local court (gerecht) and fulfilled a number of functions. At the top of their hierarchy was the sheriff (scout) responsible for keeping law and order. He was usually a nobleman, and his office was by royal appointment. Then followed one or several burgomasters or mayors and several aldermen (scepenen) who took their places in the council by a process of co-option, for which government approval was required. For example, during this period, the day to day administrative affairs of Leiden were managed by the sheriff, four burgomasters and eight aldermen. These thirteen men jointly formed the magistrature and were jointly responsible for keeping law and order locally, for matters pertaining to public health and safety, for the regulation and control of

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trade, industry, commerce, and taxation within Leiden, and local defense and public security in times of war, among other local matters. A major difference between the large cities and the smaller towns was that at the diets of the States of Holland only the six large cities had the right to vote. They did this together with the nobles of Holland, who jointly had a single vote. Decisions were made by a majority vote, notwithstanding objections by dissenters who appealed to older privileges, but there was a perception that the votes of at least four of the large cities were required for a decision to be accepted. Relationships between the large cities and their smaller, immediate neighboring towns in matters of defense were those of patron and client. These relationships become apparent when sources describing the diets of the cities and States of Holland are studied in detail, and when the response of the large cities to threats of military attacks on the small towns is seen. Haarlem helped to defend Weesp, a nearby town on the Zuiderzee, and Leiden helped to defend Woerden, a town upstream on the Rhine. In the south, Gouda and Dordrecht held a similar relationship with Oudewater and Nieuwpoort.

The Guelders War

Guelders, or Gelderland, was a large dukedom to the east of Holland which controlled trade and access to Germany over the rivers Rhine and Waal. For several decades in the second half of the fifteenth century and until 1543 in the sixteenth century, a struggle for power there went on between dukes of Guelders – Arnold, his son, Adolf, and Adolf’s son, Charles – against successive dukes of Burgundy and their Habsburg heirs, Charles the Bold, Maximilian I, Philip I, and the Habsburgs. The struggle was for a large extent a struggle for control over the Rhine valley and the territories beyond, for trade and for access to the Hanseatic League and the Baltic Sea. The struggle was also a struggle for the position of the dukes of Guelders as mediators between the Low Countries and the Holy Roman Empire. The dukes of Guelders were members of the House of Nassau, a powerful family in the Low Countries, and they were often in conflict with the other powerful families in the Low Countries, such as the House of Burgundy and the House of Austria.


and Charles V. The Burgundian-Habsburg claim to Guelders was based on arguments of legality, one of the results of which was a propaganda offensive in the form of letters and remonstrances. Maximilian and Philip found allies in the kings of England, Henry VII and Henry VIII. Duke Charles of Guelders obtained material help from France and diplomatic assistance and advice from his kinsman in Scotland, King James IV, who was allied with France.

This internationalization of the Guelders problem strengthened the hand of Charles of Guelders by giving him a semblance of legality. Without financial and military assistance from France, he would otherwise have been unable to prolong the struggle for the several decades he did. The war with Guelders, the result of which was incorporation of that duchy into the Habsburg Netherlands following the surrender of the stronghold city of Venlo in 1543, is an important part of the history of that realm as well. C. A. Rutgers has investigated the political consequences of the absorption of Guelders into the Habsburg dominions, and he concluded that the commercial interests of the urban elites in Guelders, and their links with the western Netherlands, were strong enough to make, for them, the inclusion of Guelders into the Burgundian-Habsburg dominions a desirable outcome of the war at that time. However, sources at Haarlem and Leiden show unequivocally that the cities of Holland were opposed to the Guelders war in principle, viewing it as a dynastic war of the house of Habsburg and harmful to their own immediate welfare and trading interests in Holland and abroad. Those two themes are found linked in the minutes of the local councils: the personal interest of the ruling house in propagating the war; and the dangers which the war had for Holland’s trade. Examples of sentiments which are expressed again and again in resolutions of the councils at Haarlem and Leiden are:

if her grace [the regent, Margaret of Austria] has any enemies then she should summon a diet . . . since the war is our gracious lord’s business . . . so that we do not enter the war and that the war of Guelders does not become the war of Holland . . . that his royal

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10 Arnold, duke of Guelders, died in 1473 and the States of Guelders recognized his son, Adolf, as successor. Charles the Bold, duke of Burgundy, then marched his forces into Guelders to claim his rights to the duchy which he claimed to have purchased from Arnold for 300,000 gold guilders. Philip I later inherited those rights through his mother, Mary, duchess of Burgundy, Charles the Bold’s only child. Phases and events in the war prior to the Treaty of Cambrai (1508) are not treated in this article.


highness may conclude a peace or truce so that this poor desolate country may pursue its trade and the commerce on which it is based.14 Yet, on occasion the local councils passed resolutions that, if the war was inevitable, then it should be supported and paid for by all the Habsburg dominions. This was the so-called “general war,” a term which is also mentioned repeatedly in sources at Haarlem and Leiden.15 Whatever might be asked of them, the magistrates of Haarlem and Leiden affirmed that they would conduct themselves as loyal subjects of the prince.16

The frontiers of Holland were protected by a series of castles and fortresses at places which included Gouda, Naarden, Muiden, Oudewater, and Schoonhoven.17 Not only were these attacked repeatedly by Charles of Guelders, but other towns and cities deeper in Holland were threatened and attacked, too. Haarlem and Leiden recognized how important it was for Holland’s commercial shipping to defend the Zuiderzee coast, and that Elburg on the shores of the Zuiderzee, which was occupied by Guelders’ forces, posed a threat to Holland’s overseas trade and commerce.18 In May 1508, two other towns on the Zuiderzee Coast near Amsterdam, Weesp and Muiden, were also captured by Guelders, but they were handed back shortly afterwards under the terms of the peace treaty signed at Cambrai in December 1508.

The Treaty of Cambrai between King Louis XII of France and Maximilian I, who was represented by his daughter, Margaret of Austria, regent in the Netherlands, appeared to put an end to the war. Leiden’s delegate to the proceedings, Bruynink Spruyt, wrote an optimistic letter to his fellow magistrates and aldermen at home, describing the scene and expressing the hopes of the deputies for peace.19 The treaty’s provisions included cutting off French support for Charles of Guelders. Charles of Guelders accepted the treaty on 13 January 1509, but within a few weeks of it being signed he revoked his promise. Early in 1509 the government at The Hague warned towns in Holland that Charles of

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14 GA Leiden, inv. no. 383, f. 187 (11 Aug. 1514); GA Haarlem, Vroedschapsres, 1501–1516, ff. 97v–98 (16 Sept. 1512); GA Leiden, inv. no. 383, ff. 129–129v (16 Sept. 1512); GA Leiden, inv. no. 383, f. 239 (4 Sept. 1517). Abbreviations used here are GA: Gemeente Archief/Municipal Archives; and Vroedschapsres: Resolutions of the local council.

15 A point not discussed here but which should be emphasized is that the related Habsburg-Valois wars on the borders with France were largely paid for by Flanders. See N. Maddens, “De beden in het graafschap Vlaanderen tijdens de regering van Keizer Karel V (1515–1550),” Anciens Pays et Assemblées d’Etats/Staden en Landen 72 (1978), 373.

16 GA Haarlem, Vroedschapsres, 1501–1516, ff. 43v–44 (30 March 1508); f. 69 (27 March 1511); ff. 101v–102v (26 Oct. 1512); GA Leiden, inv. no. 383, f. 96v (10 June 1511); ff. 106v–107 (30 Dec. 1511); ff. 129–129v (16 Sept. 1512); etc.

17 For a letter (with an English translation) from an eyewitness describing an attack by Charles of Guelders on Oudewater in 1512 see Ward, “Letters,” pp. 144–45.

18 For the important waterways and trade routes in sixteenth-century Holland, with a map, see Smit, Vorst en onderdan, pp. 438–40. It may be remarked here that good military roads were few and far between in Holland at that time.

19 GA Leiden, inv. no. 383, original unbound letter inserted loose (dated 5 Dec. 1508): “. . . dair zijhuyden alle dat beste van hopende zijn dattet tot eenen pays gedeyen sal.”
Guelders had written to say that “he did not wish to maintain the peace treaty made at Cambrai.” Following diets held at The Hague and at Amsterdam at the end of August 1509 to discuss defense, a delegation was sent to the regent, Margaret of Austria, to ask for help. Haarlem took the warnings of attacks by Guelders forces seriously enough to send troops to defend Weesp.

The following is a résumé of the war from then on. Cities and towns in Holland were at their most vulnerable when the waterways were frozen over because this allowed an enemy immediate access to their walls. In December 1510, during a period of hard frost, Amsterdam convinced Haarlem of the need for extra troops to defend Weesp, and it was resolved to send twenty-five soldiers there. However, the inhabitants of Weesp still felt insecure, because, as the resolutions of the Haarlem local council record:

Weesp is not well defended with the 25 soldiers who have been sent, and the inhabitants openly dare [to say], although they are forced to keep watch inside Weesp at night, if the enemy should come again they would open the gates and leave, saying that they do not want to be taken prisoner.

That winter Leiden had similar worries concerning the security of Woerden, and in diets at The Hague a larger plan was made to engage three hundred troops to guard the Zuiderzee and the area in Holland adjoining the frontier with Utrecht.

In 1511, following the breakdown of negotiations for a marriage between Charles of Guelders and Elizabeth, a sister of Charles V, the cities of the north accepted that the regent Margaret of Austria could not make peace if her “neighbor,” Charles of Guelders, remained intransigent. The failure of the large-scale campaign against Venlo with a professional army in the summer of 1511, and the defeat of Count Jan van Wassenaar in battle, again with a profes-

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20 ARA, Rek.Rek. inv. no. 343, f. 209 (undated, but before 21 March 1509): “... dat heere Karel van Gelre gescreven heeft dat hij den pays tot Camerijk gamaict niet onderhouden en wille...” Abbreviations used here are: ARA: National Archives, The Hague; Rek.Rek.: Rekeningen van de Rekenkamer/Accounts of the Chamber of Accounts.

21 GA Haarlem, Tres.rek. 1508–1509, f. 45 (27 Aug. 1509); GA Leiden, inv. no. 589, ff. 43–43v (27 Aug. 1509); GA Haarlem, Tres.rek. 1509–1510, f. 19 (4 Sept. 1509); ff. 20–20v (25 Sept. 1509). Abbreviation used here is: Tres.rek.: Treasurers’ Accounts.

22 Bells were rung daily in winter to draw attention to the by-laws, enforced by sanctions, requiring burggers to break the ice adjoining their dwellings in towns and cities before a certain hour of the day; GA Leiden, inv. no. 387, ff. 19, 25, 32, 33v, 39v, 40v, 59, 108, etc., and GA Haarlem, inv. Rood 63, ff. 7, 8v where there are multiple entries.

23 GA Haarlem, Vroedschapsres, 1501–1516, ff. 64v–65 (13 Nov. 1510). See also ff. 65v–66 (4 Dec. 1510): “… geopent is eenen brief comende van der stede van Aemdammane, dat Weesp nyet wel bewaert en is mit de XXV knechten die zij daerinn geinsonden hebben oermits dat de lantsaten hem genouch opeliek vermeten, howel zij gedwongen worden des nachts binnen Weesp te moeten waicken, dat zij nochts indien datter vyanden quamen die poinen open doen souden ende gaen wech, zeggende dat zij daer nyet gevangen en willen zijn...”

24 GA Leiden, inv. no. 383, ff. 85v–86v and f. 85A (one of several unnumbered folio pages inserted between f. 85v and f. 86).
sional army, in December 1512 impressed the cities of Holland of the need to defend their own quarters.

The two years which elapsed after he broke the truce of December 1508 were good militarily for Charles of Guelders. In Guelders he retook the towns of Harderwijk, Zaltbommel, and Hattem in 1511, despite the fact that magistrates from Dordrecht carried warnings of impending attacks to the emperor and requested military reinforcements on the frontiers. In the summer of 1512 Charles of Guelders massed his troops at Zaltbommel prior to making an attack on Tiel, which he recaptured in September. Weesp and Muiden in Holland were threatened once more as in 1508, and there were reports that soldiers ostensibly in the service of Holland were raiding the countryside. To make things worse, troops stationed at Delfshaven near Rotterdam mutinied because they had not been paid.

The soldiers who mutinied at Delfshaven, where the harbor of Delft was situated, are referred to in the sources as the four “banners” (vier vaenkens). An early sign of the impending mutiny was a letter written in May 1512 by the troops to the magistrates of Leiden about their grievances. Some time after the soldiers had made their demands known, in September 1512, the delegates to the diet of the States of Holland at The Hague, who were discussing defense plans and costs, initially took the attitude that it was no longer their responsibility to pay them. They relied on the precedent of previous levies (omslagen) with which the government had taxed the cities in order to meet the arrears in soldiers’ pay. At the same time, Leiden’s magistrates rejected governmental plans for the defense of frontiers in the coming winter in order, they said, to avoid becoming involved in the war. By agreeing to these plans, Holland would be engaging in the war with Guelders.

The mutineers wrote letters threatening to take what they thought was their due. If they were not paid by 21 September, at the latest, “that very day” they

25 GA Dordrecht, Old Archive inv. no. 443, ff. 61–61v (3 July 1512): “... den dorden in julio tot Turnhout by die K.M. om die te verthoenen hoe tot Bommel grote vergaderinge van volck was ende alle dagen toecoeemen mocht, daer eleyne defensie van volck tegens was, voersoeckende volck van oirloge optie frontieren ...”

26 GA Leiden, inv. no. 591, ff. 33v–34 (7 Sept. 1512): “Enge opte zelve dachvaert worde mede geopent hoedat doer tinnemen van Tyel tgehelle landt van Arckell ende Zuythollant open stondt, ende oock daer toe Uuytrecht enige conspiracien gemaect soude wesen omme bij den Gelreschen een aenslach te doen op Hollant, principalick op Wesip, wairomme van noode was die frontieren te besetten ...”

27 GA Dordrecht, Old Archive L, inv. no. 443, f. 63v (8 Sept. 1512).

28 GA Leiden, inv. no. 591, f. 65v: “... meester Phillips Vranckenz. van dat hij opeten Heyligen Assencioensdach [20 May 1512] te paerde gereden is bij den capiteynen van den vier vaenkens om op hem te begeeren dat zij bynnen Leyden souden wille komen, omme hemlyuden antworde te zeggen opten brieff by hemlyuden gescreeven ...”

would take their pay as best they thought fit. Faced with this choice, Leiden “chose the lesser evil” (dat men van veele quaden tminste quaet behoirt te kiesen), and provided money in order to pacify the mutineers and to get some relief for their neighbors at Delft where the mutineers’ blockade of the harbor had already caused hardship. The defense of Weesp on the Zuiderzee, however, continued to be a source of anxiety, particularly to Haarlem and Amsterdam; it was feared that the garrison stationed on the frontiers in the north might desert because they also had not been paid for many months.

At such a moment Charles of Guelders proved how self-assured he was by summoning the towns of Alphen and Arlanderveen to come to Wageningen in order to discuss their "brandschatting," the ransom money which he charged for not burning them down. Leiden’s generous response, together with Delft, was to send seventy-five more soldiers to defend Alphen and to stand by the town. But the council at Leiden reiterated that because no agreement had been reached on finances, each quarter should be responsible for its own defense. From then onwards, defense predominated the agendas of the diets at The Hague.

The military uncertainty at this time is expressed in several motions in the council resolutions. In the weeks that preceded Jan van Wassenaar’s defeat in December 1512, Leiden and Delft, noting that the quarters of Delfland and Rijnland were undefended, had shown determination to act on their own behalf. They made an agreement to defend Woerden and Oudewater and to share the costs equally.

When the winter of 1512–13 had passed, unrest in Holland increased again, caused by the discontent of unemployed soldiers and the continuous rumors and threat of attack from Guelders, which meant that defensive measures still had to be taken. Early in 1513, following the defeat and capture of Jan van Wassenaar, the enemy invaded Holland on a large scale.


31 GA Haarlem, Vroedschapsres, 1501–1516, f. 100 (12 Oct. 1512) and GA Haarlem, Tres.rek. 1512–1513, ff. 60–60v (13 Oct. 1512). See also GA Leiden, inv. no. 591, f. 35 (10 Oct. 1512): “… ende is mede versprocke dat van groote noode was dat men die capiteynen, liggende opte frontieren een zekere penning opte handt geven soude omme te scuwen inconvenienten, want zij in VIII maenden gheen betalinge gehadt en hebben…”

32 GA Leiden, inv. no. 591, f. 35v (30 Oct. 1512): “… hoedat die van Alphen ende Arlanderveen brieven omfangen hadden dat zij tot Wageningen souden comen ende verdingen, of, indien zij bijnen IX dagen niet en quamen, die Geldresche zoude commen ende verbrande hemluyden…”

33 GA Leiden, inv. no. 383, f. 134 (7 Nov. 1512): “… wandt noch gheen accordt bij der stede gestellt en is… soe sel een yglick sijn quartier bewaeren…”

34 GA Leiden, inv. no. 592, ff. 62–62v (5 Jan. 1513): “… anmerckende dat die quartieren van Delfland ende Rijnland, Woerden ende Oudewater niet beset en waeren mit knechten… dat zij die scade malekander zouden helpen dragen half ende half…”
Leiden was warned in February that there might be an attack on Rijnland, and it asked the Council at The Hague “what measures had been taken to defend the frontiers and the quarters of Rijnland against the enemy.”35 Delegates from Leiden went to Alphen to discuss defensive measures, such as breaking down the bridges and mobilizing the local inhabitants.36 Further measures were formulated at a diet at The Hague in April 1513 when the deputies “of the three cities of Delft, Leiden, and Gouda finally deliberated together that they would each defend their own quarter for the period of a month.” Deputies from Leiden then went to a diet at Gouda in order to put the details of this agreement down in writing.37 There remained little more for them to do after that but “to bite into this sour apple and to consent for a period of one month to maintain 400–500 troops.”38 In May 1513, Charles of Guelders attacked Schoonhoven, and measures were taken to prevent his incursion.39 Gouda, in helping to defend Oudewater and Woerden in its quarter, played a role similar to the roles of Haarlem with respect to Weesp and Muiden and Leiden with respect to Alphen.40 These measures taken by the magistrates reveal a mutually agreed structure for the defense of the quarters of Holland, with individual but coordinated responsibilities for the cities.

In July 1513, the Treaty of Brussels was signed with Charles of Guelders, bringing once more a pause in the fighting in Holland. But before the peace could be concluded, Leiden had to endure another severe test. This was the riot which occurred there on the public holiday called Omgangsdag (Procession Day), one of the great days in city life in the Middle Ages. At Leiden it fell that year on 8 May.

Armed, foreign mercenaries were not a welcome sight in cities and towns. Earlier that year, during the winter months, the government had offered to station a regiment of landsknechts in Leiden for the defense of the city, and the magistrates “for many reasons” had politely but firmly refused the offer which

35 GA Leiden, inv. no. 592, f. 35 (13 Feb. 1513). The term “Council” (capitalized) refers to the ruling council at The Hague, otherwise called the Council of Holland (Raad van Holland), the highest governmental institution in Holland.
36 GA Leiden, inv. no. 592, f. 32 (4 April 1513); GA Leiden, inv. no. 592, ff. 36–36v (20 April 1513); GA Leiden, inv. no. 592, f. 25 (7 May 1513); and GA Haarlem, Tres.rek. 1512–1513, f. 76v (8 May 1513).
37 GA Leiden, inv. no. 592, ff. 32–32v (16 April 1513) and f. 36v (23 April 1513).
38 GA Leiden, inv. no. 383, ff. 147–147v (20 April 1513) “... ende men verducht dat zijluyden [the enemy] int quartier van Rijnlant komen zullen, dat de stede van Leyden in eenen zueren appel bijten moet ende consenteren voir den tijt van een maent int onderhout van vier of vijfhundert knechten ...”
39 GA Haarlem, Tres.rek. 1512–1513, f. 76v (8 May 1513): “... in wat manieren men zoude moeghen beletten den inganck van den hertoge van Gelre in desen quartiere, dewelcke doe mit alle sijn macht voer Schoonhoven was etc. ...” See also GA Gouda, Old Archive, inv. no. 1170, f. 21.
40 GA Gouda, Old Archive inv. no. 42, f. 29, printed in Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap 37 (1916), 73.
had been made at the suggestion of the stadholder. Now, however, they were willing to accommodate the government by allowing the men to pass through Leiden, and, probably recognizing the danger, the magistrates offered to provide the soldiers with food and drink once they had passed, on condition that they marched through the city without delay.

But the soldiers were obstructed and prevented from entering the city. Some months later, in the wake of the very lengthy legal proceedings which resulted from the riot, a phrase used in the council resolutions at Leiden was “concerning . . . the shutting out of the soldiers.” There is some evidence that the townsmen or members of the local shooters guilds (scutters), afoot early for the procession in which they were to take part, taunted or insulted the soldiers. A prohibition on insulting behavior towards soldiers which was announced by the city council on 23 May points in that direction.

In March 1514 Charles of Guelders broke the treaty of July 1513. In an atmosphere already tainted by suspicions of treachery and betrayal on both sides, it came as no great surprise. Charles of Guelders was the weaker party militarily, and Arnhem, the capital of Guelders, was at that moment the only major center still in Burgundian-Habsburg hands. Charles used cunning, and he occupied the city in a lightning attack: Dolo pugnandum est dum quis par non est armis. At Woerden, the Guelders attack was seen as another move in the conflict which the king of France, Charles of Guelders’ “master,” had with Holland and the Burgundian-Habsburg authorities and ruling house.

The Guelders war in Holland has been likened to a guerrilla war. Attacks by Charles of Guelders up to that time had been on the scale of several hundreds of infantry and cavalrymen, reinforced with a few cannon. From 1515 onward, however, Holland was subjected to major invasions by her enemies. The first large incursion was by the so-called “Black Band.” On the evidence of a contemporary, the monk and chronicle writer Paulus Rodolphi of Rixtel, these
men took service in 1514 in the army of Duke George of Saxony who was governor of Friesland and a Habsburg ally. On George’s departure, they changed sides and joined Charles of Guelders, who was allied to some of the Frisians resisting Burgundian-Habsburg domination. Charles of Guelders then negotiated the transfer of the Black Band to the service of the king of France for a campaign in Italy.47

Early in 1515, on their way south, they appeared in Holland. In March, the government in Holland negotiated with the men of the Black Band, who numbered 4000 according to their own statement, and offered them 1000 guilders if they would leave the country. But they refused the offer, demanding 4000 guilders instead, equivalent to a week’s pay for the soldiers.48 The question then was whether to pay or resist them. The magistrates at Leiden resolved not to let them pass the city, and the government at The Hague ordered the cities to mobilize their local forces.49 By 2 March 1515, the mobilization was completed in Haarlem. Measures were also taken to open sluices and break down bridges, methods traditionally used to hinder an enemy in the Low Countries.50 But the crisis passed. City archives in Holland contain little more information about the movements of the Black Band, although it is known that by April 1515 they had traveled to Italy and near destruction at the battle of Marignano.

The next major incursion, when the country was invaded from across the Zuiderzee in 1517, was more destructive to Holland. News was received that Charles of Guelders was planning “with the Frisians and all his forces to invade West-Friesland and to overrun some of the towns of Waterland such as Enkhuizen, Hoorn or others and then to invade Holland and despoil the whole countryside.”51 On 25 June 1517, Alkmaar was attacked, taken by storm, and sacked. The destruction of Alkmaar gave rise at once to conspiracy theories that


49 GA Haarlem, Vroedschapsres, 1501–1516, ff. 152–152v (2 March 1515); and GA Leiden, inv. no. 594, f. 85 (16 March 1515).

50 GA Haarlem, Tres.rek. 1514–1515, ff. 57–57v (2 March 1515); GA Haarlem, Vroedschapsres, 1501–1516, f. 152–152v (2 March 1515); and GA Leiden, inv. no. 594, f. 85 (16 March 1515).

51 GA Leiden, inv. no. 383, f. 223v (11 May 1517). See also GA Leiden, inv. no. 383, f. 226v (24 May 1517): “... ende alsoe doe ter tijt zekere brieven gecomen waeren aen den Raedt van Hollant van mijn heere den stedehouder, inhoudende dat die heere van Gelre mit den Vriessen mitter ganser macht in meyninge waeren omme te comen int quartier van Westvrieslant om te becrachtigen enige van den Watersteden alse Enchyuysen, Hoeren ofte andere, ende voirt te slaen int lant van Hollant ende bederven tgehele platte lant ... “, and f. 227v (28 May 1517).
the government of Holland had allowed it in order to make the population more amenable to taxation for the war. Erasmus wrote to Beatus Rhenanus that “the storm was deliberately unleashed upon them.”\textsuperscript{52} The Guelderlanders were chased out of Holland shortly afterwards, and a truce was arranged at Utrecht on 17 September 1517. At Leiden there remained a strong sense of realism: “even if we have peace and a truce now, next year it can be war again.”\textsuperscript{53}

### Defense and Means at the Magistrates’ Disposal

Measures for defense taken at Leiden in 1516 and 1517 are indicative of measures taken in other cities and towns in Holland at that period. District officers (\textit{bonmeesteren}) responsible for local defense in the different quarters of the city of Leiden were required to prepare lists of the names of all able-bodied men between twenty and sixty years of age. In 1516 the magistrates at Leiden were asked by the government to send 200 men to help defend Haarlem. At first they claimed that their resources were needed for their own defense, and they declined to help either Haarlem or The Hague. But they changed their minds for fear of displeasing (\textit{thoeren} – “anger”) the king, Charles V. They resolved to recruit the 200 men, but, believing that there were not enough mercenary soldiers (\textit{knechten}) immediately available, the local militias had to be mobilized. This was done by choosing individual men of military age from the local population by lot, “the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th or 8th man, as many as will be needed to make up the 200.”\textsuperscript{54}

Shortly afterwards, the court at The Hague asked for another 150 men armed with handguns, two cannon, and a dozen harquebuses and “people who know how to use them,” together with supplies of gunpowder and lead shot to defend The Hague. Leiden replied that in the meanwhile they had discharged the men taken on earlier and could ill afford to send help, since Leiden was emptied of troops and was now also in danger of attack. It was even suggested that the men who had been discharged were a danger to Leiden since “many of them have left the city and several persons have warned that the soldiers had an eye on this city.”\textsuperscript{55}


\textsuperscript{53} GA Leiden, inv. no. 383, ff. 243–243v (28 Sept. 1517): “. . . al ist nu pays ende bestant, tmach over een jair oirloge worden.”


\textsuperscript{55} GA Leiden, inv. no. 383, f. 211 (8 Oct. 1516): “. . . veel van hemluyden uuyt der stede vertogen zijn, ende dat de stede bij diversche persoenen gewaerschuwet is als dat de knechten toge up desen stede hebben . . .”
In 1517, immediately after the destruction of Alkmaar, the local militias were mobilized once more. Every fourth man was selected from the lists by drawing lots, with the names read in public and the selected men preparing their weapons and armor to be ready to march the following day to Haarlem, near where the next attack was thought to be imminent.56 Under the date of 8 August 1517, the magistrates of Leiden ordered the defense of the eighteen districts of the city to be reorganized. Sections of ten men were appointed, each section under the leadership of a captain, and each district under that of a captain-general. The officers were required to submit lists of their men’s names to the magistrates, and they were responsible for the inspection of weapons and the general alertness and readiness. The names of the captains-general were made public “so that everyone may know under whose command he stands.” They included a knight (ridder), a university graduate (meester), and a merchant (coman).57 Others can be shown to have been members of the council (vroedschap) at that time or in other years.

A special place was reserved in the community for certain groups of men who were experienced in the use of weapons, the members of the shooters’ guilds for whom, for want of a better term, the word “militia” has been used above. Studies of the sources by Jacob Van Asch van Wijk and C. Te Lintum in the nineteenth century and more recently by Theo Reintges in 1963 allow a number of conclusions to be drawn on the origins and purposes of the medieval shooters’ guilds. Reintges’ two most important conclusions were that the shooters had their origin in the cities of Flanders around 1300 from where they spread north and east throughout the Low Countries and Germany, and that the primary purpose of the members, not to say their main goal, was to derive pleasure in shooting.58
But there were other occasions on which the shooters’ guilds had important ceremonial duties to perform. They provided escort during religious processions and on other solemn occasions, and they formed a bodyguard during royal visits to their towns. They also had a festive public function in organizing shooting contests for their own pleasure and that of others, the best known of which was the popinjay shooting. They arranged public dinners, and raised funds for the mutual support of members in times of distress, when for example they helped with funeral expenses and the like. But above all, it may be assumed from their keenness, they were primarily competent shooters. In the early stages of their history their weapons were the crossbow and the longbow, but by the fifteenth century there were also shooters’ guilds using firearms of various kinds alongside the bowmen.59

From these facts there followed a number of corollaries to Reintges’ conclusions, chief among them that the shooters had specialists’ role to fill in wartime. But, equally, he emphasized that they were not a militia in the sense of a trained reserve force of military men who could be called up to serve in wartime, nor were they (in modern terms) a para-military police force. Although they might be called “the strength and sinews of the city” (kracht en zenuwen van de stad), their military role was similar to that of all able-bodied men at the time. An expression in the sources at Haarlem which referred to defending Holland from invaders contains an echo of the Roman ethos pro aris et focis. Similarly, at Leiden members of the shooters’ guilds were bound “for God’s sake and honor” to come fully armed to defend the city if the alarm bell sounded, as were other able-bodied members of the public.60

At Leiden, Haarlem, and elsewhere in Holland, there were from earliest times two shooters’ guilds, the crossbowmen and the longbowmen. The differences in their weapons reflected a social difference in the membership. Since the crossbow was a considerably more expensive weapon than the longbow, crossbowmen of the guild of Saint George were frequently the better off and better organized men in society, like merchants and patricians, while the longbowmen’s guild of Saint Sebastian was formed from artisans and workmen.61

The numbers of shooters at Haarlem and Leiden in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries are given as 120 crossbowmen at Haarlem in the year 1402, increasing to 200 by 1566, and, at Leiden, 120 crossbowmen and 75 longbowmen.

60 GA Haarlem, Vroedschapsres, 1501–1516, ff. 152–152v (2 March 1515): “. . . updat sij [i.e. the enemy] in tlan ende ymmers an tharde niet en comen . . .” (the word harde [aerde] is etymologically related to “hard,” “earth” and “hearth” in English), and GA Leiden, inv. no. 383, loose page numbered “133v” (30 July 1512): “. . . dat een ygelick zijn harnassch, weer ende wapen bij hem gereedt houdt . . . als van Goids weghen ende eeren wegen behoirdt . . .”
61 Te Lintum, pp. 2, 11ff., 25, and Reintges, pp. 53, 73.
men in 1450, increasing and changing to 400 members with firearms in 1516. But these figures fail to show the marked swings and changes of fortune of the longbowmen’s guilds at Haarlem and Leiden in the early sixteenth century. In Leiden, the magistrates finally decreed in 1511 that the longbow was “of very little protection and defense.” They withdrew their subsidy to the guild and the use of the city’s shooting butts on 20 January 1512.

In local defense matters, the shooters were a small but important section of the population to help in defense. That could require them to fight or to keep watch from the walls and towers when danger threatened. All able-bodied men were required by law to have suitable weapons and armor, and there were sanctions against men coming on watch who were inadequately equipped. In order to maintain standards the magistrates of Haarlem, Leiden, Gouda, and Dordrecht bought weapons throughout the Low Countries and manufactured gunpowder and arms in large amounts locally. These they then sold as a service to their burghers at cost. The cheapest and most common weapons were the pike and, before it became obsolete, the longbow. Crossbows and firearms, such as harquebuses and so-called “knip” guns, were favored by the magisterial class, and they were considerably more expensive. Cannon in bronze and wrought-iron, bought by the communities and mounted on city and town walls, were even more expensive.

**Soldiers Hired by Leiden**

It was pointed out above that the members of the shooters’ guilds and others could be called on for military service. Men between the ages of twenty and sixty years were legally bound to be properly armed and to take part in the defense of their city when required. But only in times of acute necessity at the discretion of the magistrates could they be called on to go to other scenes of fighting or to defend neighboring towns. The magistrates, therefore, usually tried to find volunteers for those expeditions, or preferably professional, mercenary soldiers, before resorting to other measures.

Reasons for this preference were first and foremost that the professional landsknechts were, after all, the experts in fighting a war. Second, there were questions of law concerning the privileges of province and city, limiting the demands that the government and the magistrates could make on their own burghers. A third, more practical reason for preferring professional troops was

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63 GA Leiden, inv. no. 387, f. 29v (6 Dec. 1511): “... dat die hantboghen van zeer cleyne waer ende defensie sijn ... “, and GA Leiden, inv. no. 591, f. 59 (20 Jan. 1512). At Haarlem the demise of the longbowmen’s guild took longer; they were forced to sell their meeting place in 1531 (Te Lintum, p. 24).
that, in order to get civilian volunteers during emergencies, the magistrates of Leiden had to offer them more pay than the landsknechts earned. During the crisis of May 1508, when Weesp and Muiden were occupied by Charles of Guelders, the stadholder Floris van Ysselstein, ordered Leiden to mobilize its men of military age. Leiden said that it would pay volunteers with suitable weapons and armor 6 stuivers per day. In contrast to this, landsknechts received only 4 stuivers per day. But if there were insufficient landsknechts to make up the numbers required, then those burghers whose names had been drawn by lot to make up the first consignment (cavel) would have to serve as their officers commanded them, without the option of substituting another person in their place. Privileged and wealthy persons normally could engage and pay a substitute to take their places in the squad.

The problems of getting civilian volunteers are highlighted by the following. During an emergency in September 1516, when Leiden was ordered by the government to send 200 men to the relief of Haarlem, the vroedschap recognized that it would be difficult to get enough men to volunteer. But the council members considered whether a number of delinquents (buitendrankers – “outside drinkers”) should be allowed to volunteer. These were men who were undergoing punishment and restriction orders, some inside and some outside the city, for violating the excise laws which forbade drinking outside the city. It is not clear on whose initiative the question was raised, but the decision (unrecorded) was left to the magistrates. Again, later, in 1522, at Leiden it became necessary to offer volunteers a monetary incentive for emergency missions if they would first register their names and list their weapons and armor. If they were then required to mobilize, they would receive an immediate payment of 2 Philips guilders (equal to 50 stuivers) in advance. A conclusion, therefore, is

65 GA Leiden, inv. no. 387, ff. 11v–12 (20 May 1508): “Tgerecht laeten weten een ygelick dat zoe wye zoudie winnen wil, dat die come van stonden aen . . . wel getuyghet ende mit een goet hantweer, tsij bossen, boghen, lange piecken of helbaerden als dat behoirt, ende men sel een ygelick des dages gheven den tijt dat sij uut wesen sullen ses stuvers sdages. V oirt waerschuwen tgerecht allen denghenen die zijn van den eerster cavele dat die denselven gereet houden, wandt indien die stede gheen suffisante knechten gecrigen en mach, zoe sullen die van den eerster cavele van stonden aen moeten uuytreysen, elcx selver in persone sonder yement in hoir stede te moegen stellen . . .”

66 GA Leiden, inv. no. 383, f. 210v (3 Sept. 1516): “Is voirt gevraecht alsoe enigen buyten-

67 GA Leiden, inv. no. 387, a paper dated 5 Dec. 1522 inserted between ff. 112v and 113: “Naevolgende tscrijven van mijnen heeren van den Rade soe doen mijn heeren van den gerechte
that it was not easy at any time to find enough volunteers from the local population to serve as soldiers on emergency missions outside the city.

The cities specified in their accounts precisely the number of men and the number of “pays” for which they had made provision, and they hoped to have the costs deducted or discounted against later payments in the subsidies (bede) or the levies (omslagen) imposed on them by the government. Haarlem employed thirteen cavalrymen for garrisoning Weesp during an emergency, probably in September 1509, at the infantryman’s rate of 2 gold guilders per man per fourteen days, and the magistrates hoped that it would be discounted in the levy. The number of “pays” usually exceeded the number of men by about 10 percent on average. This was because officers and other men with rank were paid multiples of the standard. There are data allowing the number of multiple pays to be assessed exactly in some cases: where 600 men received 675 pays, and where 2000 men were calculated at 2184 pays. The multiple pays in these two cases were 12.5 and 9.25 percent respectively.

The Soldiers’ Identities

When Haarlem or Leiden hired soldiers to defend places like Weesp or Oudewater, they usually sent around 25 men each. Those landsknechts were meant to lead the civil population and to stiffen resistance offered mainly by burghers and members of the shooters’ guilds if attacks should occur. The total number of men in garrisons at those places can seldom have been more than about one hundred. But what were the ethnic origins of the men and were they recruited from the local population in Holland or not?

In one instance the size of the garrison and the identities of the soldiers can be established precisely, and the names provide insight into the ethnic origins of the men. A list comprising the roll call taken at Alphen on 30 May 1512 contains seventy names of common soldiers receiving standard pay, besides the captain, Jan van Westwalinck, and six unnamed others indicated only by their ranks. The seventy names cover both sides of a long, narrow sheet of paper. They are written one below the other, which facilitated counting and reading the names...
out aloud. The roll call was witnessed and certified by Lodewijk van Moerkercken. Elsewhere in the accounts van Moerkercken was described as warden (castelijn) of the castle at Schoonhoven and master of the roll call or muster.\textsuperscript{70}

Several remarks can be made about the derivations of these names. First, they can be divided tentatively into categories including the following (with modern spellings):

1. Unattributed Christian names: Balthazar, Gerrit.

2. Place names or toponymes:
   a) in Holland: Amsterdam, Gorinchem, Gouda, Haarlem, Heusden, Leiden, Naarden, Schoonhoven, Wassenaar, Weesp, Woerden;
   b) elsewhere in the Low Countries: Bolsward, Kampen, Gennep, Hasselt, Liège, Utrecht(?), Maastricht(?), Mechelen, Flanders (“Wlaminck”);
   c) in Germany: Duisburg, Emden, Metz, Münster, Wesel, Westfalen, Xanten;
   d) in the Baltic area: Livland, Rostock.

3. Occupation/trade: Camerling (chamberlain), Bierman, Hekelaar (a flaxworker).

4. Possible nicknames or agnomina: Fax, Quast, Schelegen, Spronck, Wanck, Witte Bote, Wlaminck (“Fleming”), Jan Bol and Jan Witte Bol, Drinckuut, Hekelaer or Hakkelaar (stammerer), Sondergelt.\textsuperscript{72}

For the early sixteenth century, proper names of geographic or regional derivation, toponyms, are a reliable indication that the bearers hailed from the places after which they are named, or from nearby.\textsuperscript{73} Assuming that at least 8 to

\textsuperscript{70} ARA, Rek.Rek. inv. no. 3411, loose page at f. 18: “Ick Lodewyck van Moerkercken, ridder, certificeere bij mijnen eede dat ick den voirs. knechten gemonstert hebbe tot Alphen up ten XXX/en dach van meye XV/C ende twaelf . . .” See also ARA, Rek.Rek. inv. no. 2191, f. 6, and inv. no. 2193, f. 14.


\textsuperscript{72} The 1993 telephone directory for the region of Rotterdam (p. 951) lists one H. Zondergelt. The name means literally “no money.” Willem and Lubbert Turck also belong to the category of nicknames, since Turck is described as “a nickname for a soldier from the wars against the Turks.” See M. Gottschald, Deutsche Namenkunde: Unsere Familiennamen (Berlin, 1982), p. 499.

10 of the other names are characteristic of Netherlanders, then the garrison at Alphen in May 1512 was made up principally of men drawn from Holland, with the surrounding Low Countries and Germany providing a significant part of the rest. The larger numbers of men from Haarlem and Woerden may reflect the unsettled state of the economies there. But perhaps the most enigmatic name in the list is that of Master Heinrick of Naarden. What was he Master of? Was he a schoolteacher, priest, university graduate in law, or artisan? He received only single pay so his qualification did not lie in the military sphere.

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74 In Friesland in 1517 the monk Paulus Rodolfi described a soldier who called himself a priest. Other witnesses remarked on the soldier-priest's unpriestly behaviour and appearance; Ottema, pp. 200–201.
Geographic Origins of Garrison Soldiers at Alphen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Minimum Number (from 70)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Low Countries</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic area</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Holland (absolute):
- Amsterdam: 1
- Gorinchem: 2
- Gouda: 1
- Haarlem: 5
- Heusden: 1
- Leiden: 2
- Naarden: 1
- Schoonhoven: 1
- Wassenaar: 1
- Weesp: 1
- Woerden: 4

In the early sixteenth century, the highest officers in command of the armies were noblemen, and personal or political friends of Emperor Maximilian and Emperor Charles V, drawn from the various regions of the empire: Floris van Ysselstein, Jan van Wassenaar, the dukes of Anhalt and of Brunswick. The captains in command of “banners” of 400 men appear to have been of both local Netherlands and German origin, although mostly the latter. Their names are indicative: Hans Beck, Jan van Delft, Jan van den Eeren, Klein Enderlein, Pieter van Leeuwarden, Willem and Lubbert Turck, Casper van Ulms, Gillis van Waart, Jan van Westfalen, Captain Zlucker. All are names which appear several times in the accounts. In Hans Delbrück’s opinion, the predecessors to the landsknechts were the Flemish troops whom Maximilian recruited in the Low Countries and with whom he defeated the French at Guinegate in 1479.

In some instances the sources are specific in identifying the mercenary soldiers organized in “banners.” Twice they are described as Germans and once, remarkably, at a diet in The Hague a plan to recruit 8000 men is mentioned, of

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76 Klein Enderlein was one of the German officers who commanded the “four banners” in Holland in 1512 and who took part in the siege of Venlo the year before: ARA, Rek.Rek. inv. no. 346, f. 139v (undated); ARA, Rek.Rek. inv. no. 3412, f. 16 (2 Oct. 1512) and f. 21 (undated). Edward Halle (c.1499–1547) describes him at the siege of Venlo: “... and all other Englishe Capitaines, and pete Capitaines, dined with an Almain called Clene Anderline...” See Edward Halle, The union of the Two Noble Families of Lancaster and York: the Triumphant Reigne of Kyng Henry the VIII (London, 1550; facsimile ed. 1970), p. 14v.
77 Delbrück, 4:8, and Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 75, 83.
whom 4000 were to be Swiss. The use of the term “German” is less surprising. When Reinier de Jonge traveled to Gouda in October 1512, it was to persuade the magistrates to guarantee the interest on loans which the States of Holland needed to pay the men of “the four banners of German troops.” The adjective used in the accounts, “duytsch,” contrasts with other terms, like “ingelanden” or “hierlandsch,” used to describe locally born soldiers. The use of “German” in this case suggests that differences in territorial origin were clearly felt, but, more to the point, that the ethnic identity of mercenary troops generally in Holland was not so obvious at that time as is assumed by modern historians.

A related question is whether or not native-born Hollanders served in professional army units of the Habsburg forces in the early sixteenth century. Bert S. Hall states that, after the battle of Guinegate in 1479, Maximilian “would find to his dismay that Flemings and Netherlanders were rather disinclined to campaign under Habsburg leadership.” Tracy, for a later period, presents the inverse of this statement with his opinion that “for reasons that have never been fully understood, Habsburg rulers did not employ Dutch-speaking troops to defend their Dutch-speaking provinces.” Various reasons have been adduced for the alleged antipathies. But who did not want whom?

There can be no doubt that, in the early part of the sixteenth century, Hollanders served as garrison soldiers in the frontier towns. Whatever the state of affairs may have been later, in the first decades of the sixteenth century there was also nothing in principle against the recruitment of army units of native Hollanders. The other 4000 men who were to be recruited in 1506 along with the 4000 Swiss, mentioned above, were described as ingelanden, meaning autochthon or native-born burghers or nationals. Furthermore, a resolution at one of the diets at The Hague in 1512 was to the effect that 1400 men, described as hierlansch [sic], should be recruited to defend the frontiers during the winter of 1512–13. But there is no evidence that the 1400 men were indeed raised

78 GA Rotterdam, Old Archive inv. no. 14, p. 92 (12 Sept. 1506): “. . . dat men in den Hage te dachvaert reyssen ende senden sal up te begeerte van hertoch Karel VIII/M knechten, daeroff IIII/M Zwissen ende IIII/M ingelanden . . .”
79 ARA, Rek.Rek. inv. no. 3412, f. 16 (2 Oct. 1512): “. . . van den rentbrief van den duysent gulden bij den Staten van den landen vercoft tot betalinge van den vier vaenkens duytsche knechten . . .”
81 GA Leiden, inv. no. 383, ff. 131–131v (28 Sept. 1512): “. . . ende dat men voirt die frontieren van desen landen besetten sel mit tgetal van XIII/C hierlansche knechten of dair omtrent . . .” There has been some discussion about the word “hierlandsch” in connection with wool imports into the Low Countries. Did it mean “Irish,” as some have said, or did it mean “native; or of these lands.” R. Van Uytven argued for the latter. His sources included accounts for wool brought to Leiden where arguably the writers used “hierlandsch” meaning “pertaining to Holland”; R. Van Uytven, “‘Hierlandsche’ wol en lakens in Brabantse documenten (XIIIde–XVIde eeuw),” Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis 53 (1970), 5–16.
locally. There were more than enough foreign mercenaries in Holland willing and happy to serve for 4 *stuivers* per day.

**Controls Exercised by the Magistrates**

Controls exercised by the States of Holland and by individual cities were first and foremost in financial affairs. Controls and audits were conducted into the subsidies and levies (*beden, onslagen*) paid to the government and in the muster and payment of troops. On 3 April 1513, the Court of Holland agreed to the request of the deputies of the six large cities “that they desired to know the accounts of the Common Land and especially the monies levied until now in the war with Guelders and to defend Holland.” Auditors were appointed to examine the accounts of Willem Goudt, Treasurer for North-Holland, in the presence of deputies of the cities. Their task was “to examine closely and to inspect the accounts, passing with the consent of the city deputies what was proper and correct, and to note where objections were and so forth and to proceed towards removal of those same objections and towards closure of the aforementioned accounts, and when that was done to remove the objections and to close the accounts.”

The magistrates of Holland also conducted musters of the troops who were under contract to defend neighboring towns and villages. In 1507, Haarlem and Leiden with “the majority of the cities resolved that they themselves desired to have the administration of payment and muster of the troops, or together with some members of the Council, in order that there should be no fraud (*bedroch*) and that each of the captains should have the full number of men, and this was agreed to by the members of the Council.” Thirty years earlier, Maximilian had granted a similar right to Flanders, the only prerogative which they shared with Maximilian, and a measure for which Wim P. Blockmans used the term, coined by Herbert Marcuse, “repressive tolerance,” because at that time it deprived the Four Members of the desire to press for more influence in high politics.

However, in Holland after 1507 it was a right which the magistrates continued to maintain in the years to come, and it had no moderating effect on their opposition to the government in financial matters. The sources contain mostly only a statement that the roll call was made, for example at Weesp by

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82 ARA Rek.Rek. inv. no. 2192, f. 1, printed in Meilink, regest no. 295.
83 GA Leiden, inv. no. 586, f. 30 (28 Sept. 1507): “Ende worde bij den steden ende tmeerdeel van dien genoecch gesloten dat zij begheerden die administracie van der betalinge ende van de monster van tvolck selver te hebben oft . . . mit eenige van den Raede updat daer geen bedroch in en geschiede ende elck van den capiteijnen zijn vol getal hebben soude, tweelek den steden genoecch bij mijn heeren van den Raide geaccordeert worde.”
magistrates from Haarlem and at Alphen by magistrates from Leiden. The first muster observed was in July 1507 when magistrates from Haarlem went to Naarden to take the roll call of soldiers whom they had stationed there on the orders of the government. After that entries in the accounts recording musters and payments made to garrison soldiers by magistrates of Haarlem are commonplace.85

In the winter of 1512–13, troops at Alphen under the command of Captain Jan van Delft were mustered by magistrates from Leiden. One of the magistrates’ related duties was to supervise accommodation for the soldiers in the outlying towns where garrisons were placed. Willem van Boschuysen, a Leiden alderman (scepen), went to Alphen on the Rhine in November 1512 to arrange billets for the 100 soldiers stationed there.86 Another example is the roll call which Heynrick van der Does, a magistrate of Leiden, carried out together with the government’s master of the roll call, Lodewijk van Moerkerken, at Alphen on 12 January 1513. Jan van Scagen from Haarlem and deputies from Delft also took part. On another occasion, Ambrosius Colen, a Leiden treasurer, checked the military rolls and receipts at The Hague jointly with Willem Goudt, treasurer for North Holland.87

Under the pressure of the costs of the Guelders War, aggravated by dike disasters and floods in Holland in the early sixteenth century, financial pressures on the cities of Holland resulted in increased control by them on government officials, particularly in military matters. In discussions held in 1511 on the continuation of the royal subsidy (bede), Haarlem and Leiden pointed out to Margaret of Austria that she received the money “in order to maintain and defend Holland.”88

Soon afterwards, Floris van Ysselstein hired an extra force of one thousand men without waiting for the consent of a majority of the large cities. They were

85 GA Haarlem, Tres.rek. 1506–1507, f. 31v (8 July 1507): “... omme monster te ontfangen van den cappiteyn ende knechten bij deser stede aldair geleyt.” See also GA Haarlem, Tres.rek. 1507–1508, f. 47v (1 June 1508); ff. 52–52v (30 Aug. 1508); GA Haarlem, Tres.rek. 1509–1510, f. 51 (undated); GA Haarlem, Tres.rek. 1510–1511, ff. 32–32v (4 Jan. 1511); GA Haarlem, Tres.rek. 1510–1511, f. 41 (1 July 1511); GA Haarlem, Tres.rek. 1511–1512, f. 56 (22 Sept. 1511); f. 56v (27 Sept. 1511), etc.

86 GA Leiden, inv. no. 592, f. 33 (3 Dec. 1512), and f. 34 (12 Jan. 1513). See also GA Leiden, inv. no. 591, f. 37v (4 Nov. 1512): “... van der stede wegen tot Alphen omme aldair te meecchen zekere biletten dair men die C knechten logeren soude, liggende onder Jan van Delft...”

87 GA Leiden, inv. no. 586, f. 30 (28 Sept. 1507), and GA Leiden, inv. no. 592, f. 34: “... van der stede wegen tot Alphen en mijnen heeren Lodewijck van Moerkercken ende van Scagen ende mit die gedeputeerde de Delf te ontfangen die monsteringe van den knechten liggende tot Alphen...”; and f. 43 (19 March 1513): “... om mit Willem Goudt, rentmeester generael, te rekenen van den knechten onderhouden bij die van Leyden onder joncker Jan van den Eeren ende Willem van Boschuysen als capptieijnen, ende hem te leveren die certificatien, monsterrollen ende quitancien daerop dienende...”

88 GA Haarlem, Vroedschapsres, 1501–1516, f. 73 (9 June 1511). See also GA Leiden, inv. no. 383, f. 96 (6 June 1511): “... ende dat mijn genadige vrouw, zoe zij bede ontfangt van den lande... behoirt tlandt wel te bewaeren ende te bescutten...”
in addition to the 2184 “pays” who were at that moment already in the service of Holland for defense during the winter. Those men were now also considered unnecessary by the council at Leiden. The vroedschap thought that they should be dismissed and that each quarter in Holland should arrange and be responsible for its own defense with the smallest number of men possible. They could be recruited, the council thought, either from the local population (ingelanden) or from the foreign mercenaries, if that proved to be necessary. Because their intention was to save on costs, there is an apparent inconsistency in this attitude of Leiden’s magistrates. As seen above, on the basis of their daily pay, local men were not less but more expensive than foreign mercenaries. But the magistrates may have thought that they could hire and fire local men on a daily basis, as circumstances dictated, while mercenaries stipulated longer periods of service, usually not less than one month and frequently several months.

Conclusion

The reasons for the long drawn-out war, lasting more than fifty years between the Burgundian-Habsburgers and Charles of Guelders, were partly dynastic and partly a consequence of the strategic geographical position of Gelderland. Lying between Holland and the Rhineland of Germany, the territory controlled trade routes via the Rhine and Waal rivers to the east and via the Zuiderzee to the north. One of the effects of the war was to make military experts, nolens volens, of the magisterial elites of Holland. Some of them became proficient in hiring and paying soldiers, arranging billets for them, confronting mutinies, controlling military dispositions and costs, purchasing and distributing weapons to the burghers, manufacturing munitions for them, supervising drills, mustering men, and organizing resistance to the enemy.

The war affected all layers of society. In the summer of 1517, which witnessed the invasion of Holland and the destruction of Alkmaar, other groups of would-be “soldiers” exercised at Leiden. They were gangs of local school-children and youths. Magistrates at Leiden reacted adversely when it became known that “many schoolboys and others were daily running through the streets with flags, sticks and staves, imitating the soldiers and throwing stones, hitting each other with sticks.” Parents were ordered under threat of sanctions by the magistrates to keep their children under control.

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89 GA Leiden, inv. no. 383, ff. 111v–112 (25 Feb. 1512): “. . . ende angaende die XXI/C/ LXXXIII payen is gestemmet ende gesloten dat men die niet al en behouft ende dat men tlandt van Hollant elcx in sijn quartier besetten sel mit seker getal van wapen als men minste mach, altijt tlandt bewairdt zijnde, ende dat tsij mitten steden ende ingelande van den quartieren ofe mit knechten indient noot zij . . .”

90 GA Leiden, inv. no. 387, f. 67 (31 July 1517): “. . . alsoe tot kennisse van den gerechte geocomen is dat veel schoelkinder ende andere dagelijcx bij de straten loopen mit vaentgens, mit stocken ende staven, ende contrefeyten de knechten ende worpen met stien ende slaen malkander mit stocken . . .”
in Leiden in 1517 were not alone. When the storm of war was released, Erasmus wrote, “youth was corrupted by all kinds of vices.”\textsuperscript{91} Writing on war as a game and on some of the psychological causes and consequences of war, R. A. Hinde considers how war toys “help to create the impression that war is a normal activity in which most adults indulge.”\textsuperscript{92} For inhabitants of the towns and cities of Holland in the early sixteenth century, it was well-nigh impossible to ignore it.

The sounds and reminders of war were everywhere. Church and town hall bells were rung during alarms and musters of the guard and daily in winter to warn burghers to break the ice near their dwellings. Joiners and bricklayers, thatchers and slaters with their ladders, noncombatants, like women and the clergy, who were fit to carry water, had to help as fire fighters when needed.\textsuperscript{93} Apart even from practice shoots by guild members, gunfire provided a frequent background noise. It was impossible to unload muzzle-loading firearms safely, and so men coming off watch in the morning were permitted to fire their weapons before returning home.\textsuperscript{94}

It can be asked whether the events of the early sixteenth century affected later generations in Holland. In the early sixteenth century, the magistrate and local artillery master, Hendrick van der Does, was one of the men who had special responsibility for weaponry and other military matters in Leiden. This Hendrick van der Does (died 12 April 1523) was a great-uncle of Johan van der Does, better known as the sixteenth-century humanist, writer and poet, Janus Douza.\textsuperscript{95} At the time of the Dutch Revolt against Philip II, Johan van der Does (1545–1605) was one of the two military commanders who successfully resisted the Spaniards at the siege of Leiden in 1573–74. Later, he fulfilled other impor-
tant functions, including that of official historian for the new Republic, and curator and librarian for the University of Leiden.\textsuperscript{96} Douza’s experiences as military commander in 1574 are reflected in a collection of poems and odes which he wrote, commemorating Dutch resistance to the Spaniards and forming a history of Holland which was dedicated to the members of the States of Holland.\textsuperscript{97} The poems do not refer to Douza’s martial relative, Hendrick van der Does, of two generations earlier, but it does not seem impossible that some of the unruly schoolboys who were born under Philip I and who incurred the displeasure of Leiden’s magistrates in 1517 for playing at soldiers lived long enough to witness their sons and grandsons fight on Douza’s side in the struggle against Philip II in 1574.

\textsuperscript{96} H. Kampinga, \textit{De opvattingen over onze oudere vaderlandsche geschiedenis bij de Hollandsche historici der XVle en XVIIe eeuw} (The Hague, 1917), pp. 25–37.
\textsuperscript{97} Johan van der Does, \textit{Iani Douzae Nordovicis nova poemata} (Leiden, 1575).